YEGNARAMA DIKSHITAR Vs. GOPALA PATTAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The inhabitants of the village of Koduvayur, who form a grama janam, own in common certain temples and moveable and immoveable properties in connection with those temples. The villagers, sometime in 1898 wanting to have the disputes which then arose, with regard to the management of these properties, settled by arbitrators, submitted to them the questions at issue. The arbitrators made an award in April 1898 and the award was filed and made a decree of Court in October 1898. By that award, it was laid down that there should be two managers to be selected, each of them from particular streets in the village, by the majority of the villagers residing in these streets. This was provided for by the decision of the arbitrators on the 6th issue. Under the 9th issue the award provided under what circumstances the managers were liable to be dismissed. It appears that in 1910 a number of villagers were dissatisfied with the management of the managers for the time being, and they issued a notice for a meeting to which all the villagers were invited to be present to consider the conduct of Rama Vadhyar, one of the managers, inasmuch as it was apprehended that if he were allowed to continue in the management, harm and loss would result to the devaswom, and "for the purpose of making arrangements to conduct the affairs of the devaswom in future properly without neglect, and in a manner conducive to the well being of the devaswom?" The meeting was held accordingly on the appointed date and. it was resolved among other things that the future management of the village devaswom should be entrusted to a committee of five villagers. The plaintiffs in the suit, who are some of the villagers interested in the communal properties, want to have it declared that the proceedings in question were not valid and binding, and the principal ground on which the contention is sought to be upheld in second appeal is that since the award, Exhibit B, which wasembodied in a decree, did not provide for any change as regards the number of managers, the community had no power except by the consent of all the members for the time being to change the method of management by increasing the number of managers from two to five. It appears that the total number of villagers at the date of the proceedings in question amounted to 164, of whom about 110 were present at the meeting and supported the resolution in question. Only 19 men opposed, they came to the meeting, but having made a formal objection, left, and the remaining members passed the resolution which is sought to be impeached in this suit. So far as this point is concerned, Mr. Rozario, the learned Vakil for the appellants, argued that the villagers were the owners of the communal properties and they were not in the position of trustees and, therefore, unless all of them consented to alter the mode of management as laid down in the award, there being no provision in the award itself for effecting any change in this respect, the majority had no power to bind the minority in such a matter by any resolution. Mr. Ananthakrishna Aiyar on behalf of the respondents on the other hand contended first of all that the villagers in this case were in fact trustees and, therefore, the Rule regarding the conduct of business by trustees applied. It is difficult in this case to hold that this contention of Mr. Ananthakrishna Aiyar is sound, because side by side with the word "urrallers" which is freely used in the pleadings as well as in the documentary evidence in the ease, the parties describe themselves as owners . Apparently none of the parties were inclined to admit that the temples were public temples and the properties belonging to those temples were public and charitable trusts. The question before us has to be decided, therefore, on the basis that the parties, namely, the villagers, are co-owners of the temples and their properties.

(2.) Mr. Rozario strongly relied on the case of Harrington v. Sendall (1903) l Oh. 921 : 72 L. J. Ch. 396 : 51 W. R. 463 : 88 L. T. 323 : 19 T. L. R. 302. in which it was held by Joyce, J., that where the rule s of a club did not provide for increasing the subscription payable by the members, a general meeting of the club bad no power to increase the subscription so far as to bind the members who had joined the club before the date of such meeting and objected to the subscription being raised, In my opinion, this class of cases has no application to the present case. The membership of a club is constituted by contract by which a member obtains a right to the enjoyment of certain privileges in consideration of his paying a certain subscription and, therefore, he may have a right to insist that no essential change shall be made in his rights unless it is warranted by the rules and regulations which existed at the time when he became member. In the present case, there is no question of any Contrac(sic)ual rights of the plaintiffs being affected. The dispute is as regards the mode of management of certain properties which are owned in common by an indefinite body of persons. Some of them may not have contributed at all to the acquisition of the properties but derived their interest by inheritance. It could not be said that any villager has a contractual right to the enjoyment of any particular benefit or privilege with respect to the communal properties. The case is more analogous to the case of a corporation which owns properties, and the principle which governs is that laid down in the cases of Rex v. Bellringer (1792) 4 T. R. 810 : 100 E. R. 1315. and Cooper v. Gordon (1869) 8 Eq. 24,9 : 38 h. 3. Oh. 489 : 20 L. T. 732 : 17 W. R. 908. In the former case, the Rule enunciated by Lord Mansfield was followed, namely, that where a corporation consists of an indefinite number, a major part of those who are existing at the time is competent to do the act but where the body is definite, there must be a major part of the whole number." And as observed by Lord Kenyon, "it is in the nature of all corporations to do corporate acts; and where the power of doing them is not specially delegated to a particular number, the general mode is for the members to meet on the charter days, and the major part who are present to do the act (page 1322)." In Cooper v Gordon (3) it is generally laid down that in such bodies (meaning congregations) the decision of the majority of the trustees binds the minority. Indeed unless the law were so settled nothing could follow but confusion and defeat of the very purposes for which these congregations are formed. The submission of the minority is the principle on which civil society is founded It is a principle essential for that reasonable harmony which is necessary for the coherence of all societies, great "or small, civil or religious" (page 258). This principle has been adopted by this Court in a very recent case---a decision of Ayling and Seshagiri Aiyar, JJ. Hasan Raza Sahib v. Hasan Ali Sahib 38 Ind. Cas. 528 : 5 L. W. 419 : (1917) 1 M. W. N. 869 : 33 M. L. J. 348.

(3.) It was observed by Chief Justice Jenkins in Secretary of Slate v. Haibatrao Han 28 B. 276 at 286 : 6 Bom. L. R. 43. "The law of the country recognized fluctuating communities as legal person capable of owning property; as for instance, the caste, and the village, and in cur opinion the hukdars here were communities composed of the religious elements their names indicate." There are many instances of castes and villages owning properties in this Presidercy. If such an indefinite and fluctuating body had not the inherent power to provide for the management of their property by means of resolutions which had the approval of the majority and passed at a meeting properly and regularly convened, the business of such communities could not be conducted at all. It is justly observed by Justice Farran in Lalji Shamji v. Walji Wardhman 19 B 107 at p. 522 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N.S) 389. that "It is clear upon the authorities that in matters relating to management of caste property and the administration of its affairs the majority of tie caste has authority to control the minority," and then after referring to a number of decided cases, the learned Judge further remarks: "But in the absence of a written or proved customary constitution I know not how the affairs of a caste could be administered if the decision of the majority duly arrived at and notified were not held binding upon the minority." He relies upon Cooper v. Gordon (3) which has already been noticed.