KIZHAKKE MELADATHI VIDVAN KOMBI ACHAN STYLED SEKHARI VARMA VALIA RAJA AVERGAL OF PALGHAT (DECEASED) Vs. KANNANPARA NAIR VEETIL KARNAVAN RAMAN UNNI ALIAS THARUVAYUR PADA NAIR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In 1842 the Government of Madras by Exhibit A put the Rajah of Palghat in possession and management of the suit devaswom which is stated to have belonged to two persons whose family had become extinct. This is the grant relied on by the plaintiff and its validity had not been called in question. The Palghat Raj is a Malabar stanom, the succession to which is in the senior male member for the time being of a large number of families who are presumably descended from a common ancestress. The grant of this and the other devaswoms included in Ex. A was made in pursuance of the policy adopted by the East India Company about this time of divesting itself of the direct management of religious institutions, and was intended in our opinion to confer the office of trustee of these various endowments on the Rajah and his successors in the stanom as a hereditary office descendible in the same manner as the stanom. This is not now contested for the respondents, and the only question before us is whether the suit to recover possession of the kanom properties is barred by limitation under Article 124 of the Limitation Act as held by the Subordinate Judge. After the very full arguments we have heard I am of opinion that this is the article applicable and that the suit is barred under it if it was not already barred under the Regulation and the previous Limitation Acts. According to the finding of the Subordinate Judge which had not seriously been disputed before us, the defendants family have been in possession since 1843 when the then Rajah purported to assign the devaswom to them under Ex. 1, Article 124 fixes the period of limitation at 12 years from the date " when the defendant takes possession of the office adversely to the plaintiff," and Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar s main argument was that the previous holders of the stanom were not persons "from or through whom the plaintiff derived his right to sue" and so do not come within the definition of plaintiff in Section 2 of the Limitation Act. According to him each successive holder of the stanom who brings a suit falling under Article 124 or 144 can only be barred under these articles if there is possession adverse to himself for the requisite period, as possession adverse to his predecessors cannot be taken into account not being possession adverse to the plaintiff within the meaning of the Act. I am wholly unable to accept this contention. A stanom according. to the customary law of Malabar is descendible from one stanom holder to another in a peculiar line of succession, and it appears to me each successive holder is in the same position as an ordinary heir succeeding on intestacy. In either case it is the law of the land and not any act of the previous holder or owner that confers title on the successor. The fact that the law of the land confers limited powers of disposition in one case and unlimited powers in the other case can make no difference. In both cases it seems to me that for the purposes of the definition of plaintiff in the Limitation Act, which is intended to include predecessors in title of whom the successor is the representative, the heir must be considered to derive his title from and through the purchaser and the intermediate holders or owners who have taken by inheritance. It would defeat the whole scheme of the Limitation Act to hold that adverse possession against the predecessors of an owner taking by inheritance was of no avail against such owner unless it could be shown that the owner derived title from him otherwise than by inheritance, and I think as I have already said that the succession to mutts, stanom, etc., stands in the same footing. As regards cases of ordinary succession I am not aware that this has ever been questioned, but if authority be wanted) it is to be found in the decision of the Privy Council on this very Article 124, in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram (1899) I.L.R. 23 M. 271 at 281 : 10 M.L.J. 29 (P.C.). There is also a strong current of authority in this Court on the present question. Subrahmania Aiyar, J., in his reference to the Full Bench in Chiruvolu Punnamma v. Chiruvolu Perrazu (1906) I.L.R. 29 M. 390, 396 : 16 M.L.J. 307, refers to the decisions in which succeeding trustees, Mahants and Malabar Stanis have been treated as claiming through or under their predecessors, and these decisions are approved in the opinion of the Full Bench at page 409, subject no doubt to the observation which was unnecessary for the decision, that they did not in strictness so claim from or through the predecessors. Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Vein Pandaram (1899) I.L.R. 23 M. 271 at 281 : 10 M.L.J. 29 (P.C.), deals with the case of trustees, Sankaran v. Krishna (1893) I.L.R. 16 M. 456 oceeds upon the same view in the case of stanis, as though Article 124 was not considered to apply--why is not apparent. It was held that the suit might be governed by Article 144 which equally raises the present question. See also Pydigantam Jagannadha Row v. Rama Doss Patnaik (1904) I.L.R. 28 M. 197. Ambalavana Pandara Sannadhi v. Sree Minakshi Devastanam (1914) 28 M.L.J. 217. Mr. Eamachandra Aiyar relied on a dictum of the Privy Council in Runchordas v. Parvatibai (1889) I.L.R. 23 B. 725, that the plaintiff who sued as next reversioner after the death of the widows of the last male owner did not derive his title from or through the widows and the extinguishments of their right could not extinguish his. In my opinion this means at most that under the existing and recent Limitation Acts which give the reversioner a fresh starting point from the death of the widow under Article 141, a reversioner cannot be treated as claiming from or through the widow. Prior to the introduction of Article 141 the next reversioner was held to claim from or through the widow, Amritolal Bose v. Rajoneekant Mitter (1875) 15 Beng. L.R. 10 and Sambasiva v. Bagava (1890) I.L.R. 13 M. 512. However this may be, this dictum which was not in any way the ground of their Lordships judgment must in my opinion be strictly confined to the case of widows and is no authority for the position that other persons such as ordinary heirs, stanom-holders, Mahants on whom property devolves by operation of law do not derive their title to sue from or through their immediate predecessors within the meaning of Section 2 of the Indian Limitation Act. In the event the suit is dismissed with costs of the 1st respondent. Seshagiri Aiyar, J.

(2.) I agree. The short point for consideration is whether the plaintiff, the Rajah of Palghat, or the defendants tarwad is entitled to the hereditary trusteeship of the plaint Devaswom. Till 1843, the Government managed it under Regulation VII of 1817. In that year, they transferred the management to the then Palghat Rajah (Vide Exhibit A) presumably under Section 13 of the Regulation. The Subordinate Judge considers that the transfer was to the then Rajah, as an individual, and that the succeeding Rajahs were not entitled to the management. He is clearly wrong in this view. Mr. Ananthakrishna Aiyar, a learned Vakil for the 1st respondent, did not endeavour to support him on this point. The first Rajah executed Exhibit I to the ancestors of the deft. What it exactly conveyed has been the subject of controversy. Acting on Exhibit I the defendants ancestor asked the Collector of Malabar to recognise him as the Uralan of the Devaswom. The Collector refused to deal with him in that capacity, Exhibit D. Then followed some correspondence with the Rajahs. Exhibits XII, C and F show that the Collector treated the successors of the first Rajah as the proper trustees. Exhibit F. is an extract from the Inam register showing that the then Rajah was the trustee. By Exhibits IX and X, the 3rd Rajah constituted the defendants ancestor, the manager of the Devaswom. This was in 1851. There is no evidence whether from the date of Exhibit A, the defendants ancestor had possession of the temple properties. The above documents make it abundantly clear that the Government transferred the right of management to the holder of the Raj as such. The practice followed in this case has been the recognised mode of dealing with Devastanams by the Government in the years 1842 and 1843. The cases of the Mahants of Tripathi and of the Jeers of the Ahobilam mutt, show that the Government in divesting themselves of their responsibility assigned their rights to persons holding particular positions who were expected to transmit those rights to their successors in office.

(3.) Further, Exhibit I leaves very little room for doubt that the right was intended to be vested in the Rajah for the time being. The Rajah was asked to " manage the affairs of the Devastanams in the same way as he managed the affairs of his own temples." This shows that the management was to be by the Rajah for the time being. I have no hesitation therefore, in holding that Ex. A was a grant to the Rajahs of Palghat, and that the Plaintiff is entitled to manage the affairs, if he has not lost the right by prescription or has not been barred by limitation.