AMRIT NARAYAN SINGH Vs. GAYA SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a suit by a Hindu reversioner to recover possession of certain properties that originally belonged to his maternal grandfather, Jhamman Singh. He alleges that the defendants, respondents before this Board, wrongfully possessed themselves of these properties under colour of certain arbitration proceedings whilst the estate was held by his mother, Kar Koer, as a female owner under the Hindu law. Kar Koer died in 1005, and this action was brought in 1908. The suit is therefore clearly within time. The sole question for determination in this appeal is whether the arbitration proceedings and the decree on the award which gave to the predecessors of the respondents possession of these properties are binding on the appellant.

(2.) On Jhamman s death Radha Koer, his widow, applied for the registration of her name in place of her deceased husband in the Collector s records. Her application was opposed by some of Jhamman s agnatic male relations, whom the respondents now represent; they claimed the property both under the general Hindu law as also under some undefined family custom. Their objections were overruled by the Revenue Courts, and Radha Koer s name was duly entered in the Collector s register. Radha did shortly after in 1864, and was succeeded in the possession of the estate by her daughter, Kar Koer, the mother of the appellant. The agnates raised a fresh contest as to her right to hold the property. In the disputes that followed, and which were eventually referred to the arbitration of a number of caste-men, she seems to have been represented by her husband, Rajander Sing. There is nothing, however, on the record to show if he had any authority to act for her as her agent. Before the arbitrators had taken any action in the matter, a compromise was arrived at, in which also Rajander purported to act both for her and her infant son, the appellant. Under this compromise, Kar Koer abandoned, in favour of the agnates, all right to the immovable property of her father, receiving on her part, besides some movable property, two small fractional shares in certain lands which stood in her and in her mother s names. The effect of the arrangement was to extinguish completely the reversionary interest of the appellant in his grandfather s estate.

(3.) The compromise was placed before the arbitrators and they were invited to make an award in accordance therewith, which they did. It is to be noted that there is nothing on the record to show that the proceedings, before the arbitrators ever came to the knowledge of Kar Koer or that the she knew of the compromise and its effect. In fact, it appears that Kar Koer did not acquiesce in the award, and the opposite party had to apply to the Civil Court under the provisions of Section 327 of Act X of 1859 (the law that regulated at the time the procedure of the Civil Courts in India) for a decree on the award. The Court of First Instance held that all the proceedings in connection with the compromise and the award had been without Kar Koer s knowledge. It accordingly dismissed the application of the agnates under Section 327.