VYSRAVANATH MANAKAL RAMAN SOMAYAJIPAD Vs. MARAMPURE THALAKKODI MADHATHIL KARNAVATHI KUNHU KUTTI KOVILAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) S.A. No. 924 of 1916. The plaintiff styling himself as the Uralan and Udama of the Kottaseri Devaswom sues to redeem a kanom of the year 1898 granted by him to the tarwad of defendants 1 to 11. Defendants 12 to 18 are now in possession of the properties. The 19th defendant obtained a surrender of the properties from defendants 1 to 11 and claimed to be the real Uralan of the Devaswom. The defendants denied that the plaintiff was the Uralan and disputed his title to recover the demised properties. Both the Courts below, though not for the same reasons, dismissed the plaintiff s suit, Hence this Second Appeal.

(2.) Before dealing with the merits of the case, it is desirable to draw attention to a feature of Malabar litigation which amounts almost to an abuse of the machinery of Civil administration. I do not in the least feel influenced by considerations of the quantum of Court-fees paid. If the legislature has framed its provisions in such a way that a right can be litigated by paying a small fee, the litigant is entitled to avail himself of that privilege to his best advantage. But where litigants are permitted to avail themselves of the indulgence of the Court to convert what on the face of it appears to be a trivial and innocuous proceeding into a suit in which grave issues involving very substantial rights and large properties are adjudicated upon, it is the duty of the Court to use all its powers to prevent such an abuse.

(3.) To come to particulars. The present suit is based on a kanom, but the matter decided has practically no bearing on that question. It is the right of rival Uralans, that of the plaintiff and of the 19th defendant that has been considered in Judgments of enormous length which necessitated the examination of numerous documents old and new. With what result V In Second Appeal, we are called upon to pronounce our opinion on findings which in some instances we can treat as dealing with facts, and which in very many respects necessitate an enquiry into mixed questions of fact and law. If the respective rights of the plaintiff and of the 19th defendant were directly in issue, the suit would have been filed in a different tribunal from which a first appeal would have been preferred to this Court. I cannot help feeling that the leniency with which such litigations are treated may enable a suitor to choose his own time and forum for prosecuting his rights. Fortunately the integrity of the subordinate judiciary in this country is so well established that there is not much fear of miscarriage of justice by such devices. But it is not difficult to imagine circumstances which may lend themselves to the unscrupulous handling of a clever suitor to the detriment of his opponent. I hold very strongly with Mr. Justice Wilkinson that Courts should, as far as possible, refuse to allow a plain plaint to be construed as containing hidden causes of action and to pronounce an opinion thereon. The parties suffer more severely than the Government revenue through such an indulgence. I feel no doubt that the use of all the powers conferred on Courts relating to the addition or deletion of parties, to the returning of plaints for amendment or for presentation to the proper Court with reference to the substantial questions in issue, would tend to advance justice and not to retard it. It may discourage,--what is now pursued as a fine art--the compelling of Courts to deal with questions which ex facie have no relevancy to the reliefs stated in the plaint.