KUNJAM VENKATARAMANAYYA Vs. DEJAPPA KONDE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts of the case are as follows: The last male holder of the properties in suit died between 1841 and 1845. His widow Venkamma and his mother Gowramma sold the properties in that year. The sale-deed has not been produced but it is clear from Exhibit K that it was an absolute conveyance. Venkamma died in 1854. Gowramma who succeeded to the properties sold them to one Vasapayya in 1857. The purchaser sued the vendee under the two widows in the same year alleging that the sale set up by the latter was fictitious and that he was entitled to possession under Gowramma s conveyance. Gowramma was the 4th defendant in that suit. It was held that the sale by the two widows was genuine and that Gowramma herself was barred by limitation as the suit was more than 12 years after the 1st sale, the purchaser was also barred by limitation. It is clear that Gowramma never got possession. She died in 1908 and the present suit was brought within 12 years of her death by the reversioners to recover possession.

(2.) The Courts below have held that the suit was barred by limitation and that the sale must be presumed to have been for legal necessity. I am unable to uphold the latter conclusion. The onus is undoubtedly on the purchaser to establish necessity. Lapse of time may enable the Court to consider the evidence let in by him favourably and to pay more attention to the recitals in the conveyance than would otherwise have been done. But the considerations can have no weight when there is no substantive evidence on the question of necessity. See Ravaneshwar Prasad Singh v. Chandi Prasad Singh (1911) I.L.R. 38 C. 721 at 739. I therefore hold that necessity has not been established.

(3.) On the question of limitation, I agree with the conclusion of the Courts below, though not with the reasons assigned for it. Under the Limitation Act of 1859, if the widow is barred by limitation, the reversioners would be equally barred. This is well established. See Nobinchandra Chakrabarti v. Issur Chandra (1885) 9 W.R. 505. and Sambasiva v. Raghava (1890) I.L.R 13 M. 512. The decision on review Raghava v. Sambasiva (1891) 1 M.L.J. 392, does not affect this question. This principle does not apply to alienations by the widow. Where a widow conveys property, no question of adverse possession as against her arises, unless the conveyance is inoperative to pass property. Further her conveyance would vest in the purchaser all that she is capable of granting, namely her life interest and it is not incumbent upon the roversioner either to seek to displace the alienee or to obtain a declaration that the alienation will not bind his interests. Although under the Specific Relief Act, (at least after the Limitation Act of 187.1) he can sue for a declaration if he chooses, he is not bound to adopt, that course. The result is that he is entitled to hold his hand until the widow dies. His right under the Hindu Law accrues only on her death and therefore he is not affected by the alienation of the widow. Pursut Koer v. Palut Roy (1881) I.L.R. 8 C. 442 and Sambasiva v. Raghava (1800) I.L.R. 13 M. 512 are authorities for the position that although under the Limitation Act of 1859 what bars the widow would bar the reversioner, her alienation would not give a cause of action, so as to bar him when succession opens. The courts below are therefore wrong in holding that the suit was barred on this ground.