(1.) THESE are two applications by Mr. G. S. Dand-vate, a Pleader of this Court, for leave to appeal to the Privy Council against two orders dated the 21 August 1907 and 23rd September 1907 respectively, passed by this Court in the exercise of its disciplinary jurisdiction under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent whereby the applicant was suspended from practice for the period mentioned therein. The applicant admits that his applications do not come within the provisions of Chapter XLV of the Civil Procedure Code, which deal with the procedure to be adopted in the caseof appeals, to the Privy Council, which are allowed to be made under Clause 39 of the Letters Patent, but he relies on the decision of the Allahabad Court, In re S.B. Sarbadhicary (1906) 11 C. W. N. 274, as reported in the Calcutta Weekly Notes from which it appears that in a similar case to this the learned Judges of the Allahabad Court although they thought it was not necessary, granted leave to appeal following the practice as laid down by two previous decisions of the Allahabad Court, In the matter of Parbati Charan Chatterji (1895) L.R. R. 17 All. p. 498, and ln the matter of RajendroNath Mukerji (1899)I. L.R. 22 All. 49. In the first of these cases it does not appear from the report whether leave was granted but in the second case a certificate was granted under Section 595 of the Civil Procedure Code, However that may be,it appears from the report of Sarbadhi-cary's case (1906) L.R. 34 I.A. 41, that the appeal was by special leave and therefore the permission granted by the High Court did not obviate the necessity of the appellant applying for special leave. It does not appear moreover that the question whether the Court had power to grant the leave was argued in Sarbadhicary's case, but that is the point at issue now before us. In Morgan V/s. Leech (1841) 3 M. P.C. 368, the Judge of the Bombay Supreme Court had made a rule for the admission of attornies which was contrary to the provisions of the Charter constituting the Supreme Court under the authority of 4 Geo IV. c. 71 and the appellants appealed against an order admitting the respondent as an attorney under the said rule. Their lordships of the Privy Council held that the order not being in the nature of a judgment or determination was not an appealable grievance within the Charter, but it was competent to them to advise Her Majesty to grant the appellants leave to appeal. Following the analogy of that case we think that no appeal lies by right of grant against an order of the High Court under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, as it is not in the nature of a final judgment, decree or order under Clause 39, and that therefore the High Court has no power to grant leave to appeal. The aggrieved party must proceed by way of petition to His Majesty the King for leave to appeal. See Safford and Wheeler's Privy Council Practice at pp. 726, 730 and 789. The rule must, therefore, be discharged with costs.