MUHAMMAD KAZIM Vs. MIAN KHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts out of which this second appeal arises are as follows: The defendant first party had been granted a lease for seven years by the defendant second party over certain land, the subject matter of the present appeal. The lease was granted on the 24 July 1901. The defendant second party ceased to hold the position of lambardar before the present suit was brought and his successor, the plaintiff, here the appellant, brought the suit out of which this appeal has arisen to have the lease cancelled. He alleged that the lease had been given out of sheer dishonesty and in order to cause loss to pattidars, and is one of several leases, which had been given by the late lambardar. In defence fraud was denied. It was pleaded that the lease was lawfully, executed for consideration, and that before the execution of the lease the lessee had cultivated the land on payment of rent at 8 annas a bigha. The lease set out the annual rental of the land to be Rs. 3 a bigha. The Court of first instance decreed the claim. In appeal the learned District Judge, after finding that no fraud had been proved, went on to say that while the rent was lower than the rent paid for the neighbouring fields, still the land is under the disadvantage of containing salt and is liable to inundation and able to produce only one crop in a year. It accordingly held that the plaintiff had failed to make out his case. The appeal was decreed and the suit of the plaintiff dismissed with costs.

(2.) In appeal here it was contended that the lambardar was not competent to grant a lease beyond the requirements of a particular year or season. In support of this reliance was placed on a ruling of this Court in Jagan Nath V/s. Hardayal Weekly Notes, 1897, p. 207 and also the cases of Bansidhar V/s. Dip Singh (1906) I.L.R., 20 All., 438, Mukta Prasad V/s. Kamta Singh Weekly Notes, 1906, p. 277 and Chattray V/s. Nawala (1897) I.L.R., 29 All., 20.

(3.) The first of these cases was one in which the lambardar had granted a perpetual lease of the common land of the village and within a few months of the granting of the lease one of the co-sharers came in and sought to have it set aside. It was held that the lambardar was not authorized to grant a perpetual lease, and the learned Judges went on to say, page 208: "So far as we are aware a lambardar has no general power to grant any lease of coparcenary land beyond such as the circumstances of the particular year or particular season may require."