R D SETHNA Vs. MIRZA MAHOMED SHIRAZI (NO3)

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question being whether a counsel who has conducted his clients case can be called and allowed to give evidence as to material facts which occurred before he was retained, I think the answer must be given not with reference only to the provisions of the Evidence Act, but upon general principles and with special reference to the prestige and responsibilities of the bar. What earlier English lawyers thought of the practice is made plain enough by the language used by Lord Campbell, in describing what was done at the trial of Sir Thomas More (1535) How. St. Tr., 386, 390 where he said, with reference to the Solicitor-General offering himself as a witness and being allowed to testity, that it was an " eternal disgrace to the Court who permitted such an outrage on decency. "

(2.) The same point arose in Stones V/s. Byron (1846) 4 Dow. & L. 393 and this was made a ground for ordering a new trial. The same principle was confirmed in a later case of Deane v. Packwoodi. (1847) 4 Dow. & L. 895.

(3.) It is therefore clear that the opinion of English Judges has been, so far as I can find any expression of it, unanimous against counsel who have " warmly and sedulously " espoused the cause of the client, being allowed to offer themselves as witnesses on his behalf.