GULAPPA DONINGAPPA Vs. TAYAWA KEMPANNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ON the authority of the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Sheo Shankarlal V/s. Debi Sahai (1903) L.R. 30 I.A. 202 and Lal Sheo Pertab Bahadur Singh v. Allahabad Bank (1903) L.R. 30 I.A. 209 it is contended that property inherited by a daughter from her father under the Mitakshara law is not such stridhan,as on her death devolves on her daughter but that it must go to her sons as if she were a male. Those decisions, however, turn upon the law of the Benares School and the Judicial Committee expressly confine their ruling to it. ON this side of India a different law has prevailed as may be seen from a series of decisions of this Court. See Navalram Atmaram V/s. Hand Kishor Shiv Narayan (1865) I.B.H. C. 209; Tuljaram Morarji V/s. Mathuradas (1881) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 662; Bhagirthibai V/s. Kahnujirav (1886) I.L.R. 11 Bom. 285; Jankibai V/s. Sundra (1899) I.L.R. 14 Bom. 612; Gandhi Maganlal v. Bai Jadav (1898) I.L.R. 24 Bom. 192 : 1 Bom. L.R. 574; Vijiardngam V/s. Lakshuman (1871) 8 B.H.C. 244; and Manilal Rewddat V/s. Bai Rewa (1905) I.L.R. 30 Bom 229. ON the principle of stare decisis we must adhere to the law as it has been expounded by this Court. (See Bhau v. Raghundth (1905) I.L.R. 30 Bom. 229 We confirm the decree with costs.