JANAK SINGH Vs. ADYA SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Monghyr reversing the decision of a Munsif of Monghyr. The suit which has given rise to this appeal related to 34 bighas 9 kathas and 16 dhura of land in mauza Rahatpur tauzi No. 1407-939. These lands appertained to a khas mahal area and the plaintiffs case was that they had received settlement thereof from the defendants second party who are maliks or farmers of the village and their names had been recorded as tenants in the papers which were prepared during the khas mahal survey of 1926-1927 and 1931-1932. Subsequently there was a quarrel between them and the landlords, as a result of which the latter granted fabricated receipts and hukumnamas to the defendants first party and ultimately the names of the latter were recorded in the survey proceedings of 1937-1938. After these proceedings there was a proceeding under Section 144, Criminal P.C., with regard to the disputed land. No final order was passed in this proceeding as there was a tanaza pending between the parties before the Settlement Officer. Ultimately the tanaza was decided against the plaintiffs and the defendants first party dispossessed them on 25 Kartik 1346.

(2.) The suit was contested by defendants first party whose case was that the disputed land never belonged to the plaintiffs; that those lands had been settled by the defendants second party with the defendants first party and that they had been in peaceful possession thereof for a long time. It was also pleaded by the defendants first party that the suit was barred by limitation.

(3.) The trial Court decreed the plaintiff's suit but the lower appellate Court has reversed the judgment of the trial Court and dismissed the suit holding among other things that the suit is barred by Art. 3 of Schedule 3, Bihar Tenancy Act, which provides a period of two years as the period of limitation for a suit to recover possession of land claimed by the plaintiffs as raiyats and further provides that the period of limitation shall run from the date of dispossession. The lower appellate Court has also held that on the merits the plaintiffs are not entitled to succeed and in arriving at this finding it has remarked that the presumption arising from the latest survey entry has not been rebutted. The plaintiffs have now preferred this second appeal.