LAL BAHADUR SINGH Vs. SURAJPAL SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I do not propose to refer this question in revision to a Pull Bench, although it is undoubtedly one of some interest. But it arises in revision and I think it would be better if I dealt with it myself to the best of my ability. The point is a very short one. A suit was brought by a plaintiff against a defendant under Section 9, Specific Relief Act. The plaintiff alleged that he had been in possession of certain plots of land within six months and had been dispossessed of them by the defendant. On these simple allegations, and no more, he claimed possession. The answer given by the defendant, so far as it is material to this revision, was that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the case at all. The ground on which this was asserted was that the suit was taken out of the jurisdiction of the civil Court by Section 242, U.P. Tenancy Act. That section runs in this way: Subject to the provisions of Section 286 all suits and applications of the nature specified in Schedule 4, shall be heard and determined by a revenue Court, and no Court other than a revenue Court shall, except by way of appeal or revision as provided in this Act, take cognizance of any such suit or application, or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. Explanation. If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief might be granted by the revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil Court may not be identical with that which the revenue Court could have granted.

(2.) Now, what is said is that the claim of the plaintiff for possession made before the civil Court in this suit is "based on a cause of action in respect of which relief could" have been obtained by means of such a suit as is specified in Schedule 4, U.P. Tenancy Act. The two relevant types of suit specified in Schedule 4, U.P. Tenancy Act, are those which are described in Secs.180 and 183 of the Act, and we must, therefore, look at these since they are included in Schedule 4, to see if they are suits based on a cause of action which is the same as the cause of action on which the suit, in the civil Court of the present plaintiff is based. Section 180, Tenancy Act, is a section which provides for the ejectment by the Court of any person who takes possession (that is who dispossesses another) "without the consent of the person entitled to admit him as tenant." That, therefore, is a section which requires the person who is dispossessed to show, not only that he has been dispossessed, but that he has been dispossessed by a person who has taken possession from him without the consent of whoever it is who would have been entitled to admit the dispossesses as tenant. That is one section.

(3.) The other section is Section 183. That section affords various remedies to "any tenant ejected from or prevented from obtaining possession of, his holding or part thereof..." Under this section, therefore, the dispossessed person has to prove first of all that he was a tenant, secondly, that he was a tenant of a holding, thirdly, that he has been dispossessed from that holding or from part of it, and, fourthly, that such dispossessing was not in accordance with the provisions for the time being of the law. And, indeed, there are various other things that he must prove as well. What I have to consider is whether the causes of action in respect of which relief could be obtained under either Section 180 or Section 183 are the same as that cause of action on which a man founds his claim when he comes to the Court for relief under Section 9, Specific Relief Act. That brings us to that section.