BHAIRO MAHTO Vs. RAJKISHORE SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In my judgment this appeal fails. It arises out of an action for libel consisting in two petitions, one addressed to the Deputy Commissioner and the other addressed to the Manager of the Court of Wards. At the appeal stage of the case for the first time the pleader for the defendants took the point that the circumstances disclosed a case of absolute privilege. The learned Judge overruled that contention; and referring to an authority upon which the defendants relied he observed: Evidently the principle enunciated therein has no bearing on the present case because the petition (Ex. 2) cannot, by any stretch of imagination be considered to be a complaint addressed to a Magistrate.

(2.) He then proceeded to say that the question had not been raised in the written statement and that "their prayer ... was apparently for private (Khophia) enquiry," and that "the criminal law as administered in this country did not entertain any private enquiry." Now the authority upon which reliance was placed in this Court is the decision in Ram Kirat V/s. Biseswar Nath 1983 Pat 35 where the learned Chief Justice sitting with Kulwant Sahay, J. without stating in detail the facts, states that the petition there was addressed to a Magistrate making allegations against the plaintiff of oppressive treatment as a landlord. If an application is addressed to a Magistrate, then on the authorities in India, that would be a privileged occasion. But it must be remembered that the application must be addressed to the Magistrate as such and must be in the nature of an information which is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. Such is the case reported in Sanjivi Reddy v. Koheri Heddi 1926 Mad 521 where it was held by a Bench of Judges of the Madras High Court that an occasion of that kind was absolutely privileged. Another authority is found in Re M. Naidu V/s. Emperor 1914 Mad 472, but that is of no assistance in this case because the learned Judges were there dealing with a criminal prosecution for libel or defamation specifically and not for a civil proceeding. As has been pointed out so many times and as is obvious, the considerations in the two different classes of case are quite different.

(3.) The difficulty if any, which arises in this ease, is owing to the fact that the parties raised this question at a very late stage of the hearing. But I am bound by the decision of the Court below on the question of fact and the learned Judge decides that this was not a complaint addressed to a Magistrate but addressed to the Deputy Commissioner and also as already stated a petition to the Manager of the Court of Wards. Now taking the best view one can of those circumstances having regard to the statement by the Judge in the Court below, the most that could be said is that it was a case of qualified privilege. Now in a case of qualified privilege, the onus is in the first instance, (and it has so often been stated to be an onus which is very easily discharged) to prove that the privilege exists. This could have been proved in the circumstances of this case by showing that there was a common interest between the Deputy Commissioner and the tenant-defendants and also a common interest between the Manager of the Court of Wards and the tenants again. But the fact is that they did not raise that in their written statement, nor did they have the Judge of the trial Court to settle any issue on this point. Now if I were to hold that this was a case of qualified privilege in the circumstances, I should also be obliged to hold that the plaintiff had not discharged the onus upon him to prove that although the occasion was an occasion of qualified privilege the defendants did not use that occasion in a proper way; in other words they acted maliciously. That sometimes is a very difficult point to establish. I could hold in this case that there must be judgment for the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff had not discharged the onus which lay upon him. But in my judgment, to come to such a conclusion having regard to all the facts of the case would be absolutely unjust. It would be stating that the plaintiff had not discharged the onus when he had never been called upon to discharge such an onus, the defendants having been (as we now know) throughout upon the defence that what they stated was true. It has been found that the defence is false. I think the matter is concluded by the finding of the Judge in the Court below that it was a complaint addressed to the Deputy Commissioner and the Manager of the Court of Wards asking these two officials for a private enquiry into the matter. It would appear although perhaps it has no bearing on the decision of this appeal, that the defendants were not entirely sure of their own ground. To repeat myself even if I hold that the occasion was an occasion of qualified privilege, it would be unfair to allow the defendants to succeed as this question was not raised and the plaintiff never had the opportunity of proving what he ought to have proved. In those circumstances it seems to me that the appeal fails and it must be dismissed with costs.