SATISH CHANDRA BASU Vs. HARENDRA KUMAR GHOSE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of arrears of rent. Plaintiffs claimed rent at the rate of Rs. 3 per kani on the basis of a lease of the year 1264 B.S. in respect of their 5 annas 3 gandas 1 kara and 1 krant share of the land demised. The defence of the tenants is that the plaintiffs are entitled to get rent at the rate of Rs. 2 per kani. The trial Judge overruled the defence and passed a decree for arrears of rent at the rate claimed by the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed to the lower appellate Court. The learned Additional District Judge has allowed the appeal in part. He has affirmed the rate decreed by the trial Judge in respect of 1 anna share but in respect of the remaining share he has reduced the rate to Rs. 2. Hence this second appeal by the plaintiffs. The defendants have also filed cross-objections.

(2.) Mr. Gupta appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs appellants has raised two points in this appeal. The first contention is that the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in reducing the rate of rent on the basis of the two subsequent leases of the years 1289 and 1290 B.S. inasmuch as these documents were not registered in accordance with the provisions of Registration Act and are therefore inadmissible in evidence. His argument is that though there was no intention to demise certain shares in some properties lying within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Registering Officer at Dacca where these documents were registered, these lands were included in the two documents simply for the purpose of getting the documents registered at the Dacca Registration Office and consequently the registration was void as the properties really intended to be demised by the two leases were situated wholly in the district of Bakargunj. The question about the intention is primarily a question of fact and it appears from the judgment of the lower appellate Court that the lessees being men of the Dacca District really took settlement of these properties in the Dacca District along with the lands in the District of Bakargunj. This contention therefore is overruled. The second point raised by Mr. Gupta is that the registration of the lease of the year 1289 B.S. (Ex. B-2) is invalid inasmuch as it was presented for registration by a person who had no power to do so. It appears that the name of the lessor who granted the lease was signed on these documents by the pen of her son on the basis of an ammuktearnama. It further appears that the son presented the document for registration before the Registering Officer and admitted the execution of the document and on that admission the document was registered. The question is whether the presentation of this document for registration by the son was a valid presentation. By Section 32, Act 3 of 1877, a person executing a document or the agent of any such person is entitled to present the document for registration.

(3.) The words "persons executing the document" are capable of two constructions. They may mean persons actually signing the document by their own hands or persons executing the document by the hand of another duly authorised to sign on their behalf. In Mohammad Ewaz V/s. Birj Lall (1875) 1 All 465, Sir Montague E. Smith, while construing the provisions of Section 34, Registration Act of 1871 made the following observations: There the persons described are the persons executing the document not those who on the face of the deed are parties to it, or by whom it purports to have been executed, but those who have actually executed it: