BABU LAL CHAUKHANI Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) We now propose to give our reasons for rejecting the petition made to us last Monday on behalf of one Babulal Chaukhani. The petitioner, it appears, together with a number of other persons was put on his trial before a Magistrate for offences under the Electricity Act and also for conspiracy. A number of convictions resulted, including the petitioner s. Then a visit was made to the Court of appeal with the result that, so far as the petitioner was concerned, his conviction for conspiracy was set aside, but the Court preserved his conviction for theft under the Electricity Act. On that conviction he was sentenced to undergo one year's rigorous imprisonment.

(2.) As I understand it, the Court of appeal dealt with the cases of his co-accused and I believe these persons are now undergoing their punishment in jail. The petitioner approached us for the purpose of obtaining an extension of the time within which he would surrender to his bail before the Chief Presidency Magistrate. He had approached the Magistrate already who allowed him the concession of not surrendering until, I think I am right in saying, the 29 of the last month but beyond that the Magistrate was not prepared to go. The reason that the petitioner asked us to exercise the discretion of the Court in his favour was that he had instructed his solicitors in England to place a petition before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council with regard to an appeal before their Lordships. He mainly relied upon a case decided comparatively recently by a Bench of the High Court of Allahabad. That was the decision of Sulaiman and Bannerji, JJ., in Emperor V/s. Ram Sarup 1927 All 97. The learned Judges there decided that they had inherent jurisdiction to stay the execution of their own order when the ends of justice so required it and they could admit to bail a person whose appeal had been admitted by the Privy Council. The judgments of the Court showed that they relied upon the provisions of a new section in the Criminal Procedure Code, Section 561-A, which deals with the preservation of the inherent power of the High Court to make orders which might prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and so on. It is to be noted that the facts in that case were not analogous to the facts before us now, because in the course of their judgment the learned Judges made this observation: Before surrendering and before any appeal to their Lordships of the Privy council was actually filed, the accused applied to this Court for bail on the ground that they have sent instructions to a Solicitor in England for lodging a petition for special leave.

(3.) Then follow the important words: The High Court naturally refused to entertain the application so long as the accused had not surrendered. After information had been received that they had surrendered, the Bench i.e., the earlier Bench of the Allahabad High Court which dealt with the matter dismissed the application, but without prejudice to the right to bring another application in the event of special leave being granted by the Privy Council.