JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEB Vs. SHANKARSHAN BHUMIJ

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal arises out of a suit brought in 1930, by the proprietor of the Dhalbhum estate for a declaration that the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum, dated 16 May 1930, in T.A. Miscellaneous Case No. 3 of 1920, appointing under the provisions of Section 74.A, Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, defendant 1, Shankarsan Bhumij as pradhan of Dhanga-am, a village in the estate, is illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction, and for recovery of khas possession of the village, or rather of that portion of it set out in Schedule (ka), by evicting defendant 1 therefrom. The plaintiff was successful in both the Courts below.

(2.) The plaint sets out as follows: In 1898 the khorposhdar holding Dhanga-am under the proprietor appointed Sudharsan Bhumij, father of defendant 1, pradhan of the village on a temporary basis for a term of nine years. The Dhalbhum estate was under ijara from 1905 to 1929 when it came into khas possession of the plaintiff. Sudharsan Bhumij held on from 1906 with the consent of the landlord until the khorposh lapsed to the parent estate when the manager of the encumbered estate, as Dhalbhum then was wishing to take Dhanga-am into khas possession and Sudharsan Bhumij being unwilling to continue as the pradhan verbally surrendered, the pradhani office in 1915 from which date the estate is in the khas possession of the village without appointment or existence of any pradhan and in 1919 Sudharsan further executed a registered deed of abdication in favour of the manager. Nevertheless on 12 February 1930, the three pro forma defendants applied to the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum on the allegation that there was a pradhan in Dhanga-am from its first establishment and it was the custom that a pradhan should hold the village and prayed for appointment of a pradhan under Section 74-A, Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. The Deputy Commissioner appointed defendant 1, Shankarsan Bhumij, son of the previous pradhan to be pradhan, of Dhanga-am and he is in possession as such. The plaintiff sets out that in fact according to the custom of Dhanga-am there has not been a pradhan throughout and also the application was barred by limitation and he accordingly craves that the civil Court will declare him entitled to and give him khas possession of the lands mentioned in the Schedule after evicting defendant 1 therefrom.

(3.) In his written statement the principal defendant claimed that the suit was not tenable under Section 74-A (5) of the Act and was not triable in the civil Court under Section 139(6) of the Act; that the description in Schedule (ka) was incorrect, that the tenants of the mauza and the Secretary of State should be parties and that the suit was undervalued. On the facts he contended that Dhanga-am was not a khas village but from time immemorial has been held by his ancestors in pradhani right, that they had held long before 1898 and the appointment of 1898 also was not on a temporary basis and that they were entitled to a heritable pradhani right even without a patta, the sole right of the landlord being to realise the pradhani rent from the defendant. The allegations as to surrender in 1916 were denied, the bona fides of the application under Section 74-A asserted and the finding of the Deputy Commissioner that the mauza was pradhani supported. The Munsif of Jamshedpur held that the plaintiff had no cause of action, that the suit was not triable in the civil Court but was barred under Section 74-A, Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, that Dhanga-am was always a pradhani mauza and the appointment of pradhan was never a temporary one; that the order of the Deputy Commissioner was not ultra vires and liable to be set aside and that the plaintiff was not entitled to obtain possession of the lands in Schedule (ka). He found however that Sudharsan had surrendered the office of pradhan to the manager of the encumbered estate, as he had taken raiyati settlement of the man lands which were the remuneration of the pradhan and had thereafter paid rent, but did not find from what year he had done so. (Actually as the Record of Rights admittedly shows the position is that the man remuneration consists merely of the freedom from rent of Sudharsan's own khuntkatti occupancy lands, which of course he was entitled to retain as such even if he ceased to be pradhan.) The meaning of the term raiyati settlement is that on demitting office his ancestral lands were assessed to the rent which they would have borne in the hands of any raiyat of his class. It may be further observed that though these plots of his khata No. 7 are also included in the lands in Schedule (ka), it is, as Mr. P.R. Das admits, only as part of the pradhani tenancy and not on any claim to direct possession.