(1.) This is an unfortunate case but we see no way of upholding the principal contentions of the appellant before us. She sued for possession of her husbands properties on the footing that her husband had died intestate. The defendants pleaded that the plaintiff's husband had executed a will Ex. II on 27 August, 1910, whereby the properties referred to in the will had been given to one Subadramma the then living wife of the deceased for her lifetime and after her death to the contesting defendants.
(2.) The plaintiff questioned the genuineness of the will but the lower Court has rightly held that the evidence in its favour is such as to place its genuineness beyond doubt. This finding has not been seriously attacked before us.
(3.) It was next suggested that as the testator lived for nearly 20 years after the date of Ex. II, lost his first wife in the meanwhile, married another wife, viz., the plaintiff and acquired properties subsequent to the date of the will, the Court must draw the inference that the will of 1910 must have been revoked. It is true that no particular formality is necessary under the law in the mofussal for showing an intention to revoke a will, but when an inference in favour of revocation is asked to be drawn from the conduct of the testator the conduct must be such as to show that his mind was directed to the question whether the will was to remain in force or not and his conduct proceeded on the footing that the will was no longer to be in force. We find no basis for any such inference in this case. Even as a matter of surmise, the utmost that can be suggested is that the testator never afterwards thought about Ex. II, or perhaps forgot about it. The defendants have attempted to lead positive evidence to the effect that the deceased wanted that the will should remain in force, but, putting that evidence aside there is nothing to support the inference of an intention that the will should cease to have operation.