RANI MOHINI SUNDARI Vs. DISTRICT JUDGE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Rule was issued on the learned District Judge, Murshidabad, calling upon him to show cause why an order passed by him in a guardianship proceeding should not be set aside.

(2.) The order was made by the Judge on July 20, 1936, in connection with an appointment of a Manager by the guardian appointed by the Court, and the direction contained in the order was that the guardian should deposit within a fortnight Rs. 1,500 representing six months pay of the Manager proposed to be appointed but whose appointment to the office was not completed for the reason that he was not able to secure a Fidelity Bond as he was required to do by the terms of an agreement. The learned District Judge has in the case before us shown more than usual interest in the matter of appointment of Manager by the guardian for reasons best known to him and has used language in his order against which this Rule is directed as also in his explanation submitted to this Court, which cannot be said to be well balanced. We very much regret to notice the same. It is not very unusual to find learned District Judges losing their balance of mind when dealing with guardianship cases, and it is not at all uncommon that drastic action is taken and plenary powers exercised by them over the guardians appointed by them, for the purpose of looking after the interest of the minors committed to their care. It goes without saying that, the exercise of such powers should be kept within limits provided by law, and should not be wholly arbitrary, made before necessary enquiries are held in the manner provided by law. The facts and the circumstances of the case have been placed before us in detail; and they have been exhaustively dealt with by the learned Judge himself in his explanation submitted to this Court. The guardian in this case before us was not altogether free from blame; but the order with which we are concerned was wholly unjustifiable. The District Judge has himself in his explanation characterized the order as summary; one which might seem arbitrary. We have no hesitation in stating that it is arbitrary and must, therefore, be set aside.

(3.) In setting aside the order passed by the learned District Judge on July 20, 1935, we direct that the prayer made by the guardian in his application filed in this Court, on August lei, 1936, a copy whereof is to be sent to the District Judge along with our decision, be taken into consideration, and necessary action be taken on the same in accordance with law. It is to be decently understood that it would still be open to the learned District Judge to act in consonance with the provisions contained in Secs.43 and 32, Guardians and Wards Act, in the interest of the minors concerned. The records are to be returned as soon as possible.