(1.) The suit out of which this appeal chariar, J. arises was instituted by the plaintiff, who was then one of the trustees of Sri Kapaleesvvarar temple, Mylapore, asking for an injunction restraining the first defendant from claiming joint possession and custody of the temple jewels, gold and silver articles and other movables of the temple along with the trustees and from demanding delivery of the keys of the temple safes. The temple is admittedly one falling under Section 3 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863), which still remains in force so far as the City of Madras is concerned. The first defendant holds what is known as the office of Overseer in the said temple, having been appointed thereto by the Madras Hindu Devasthanam Committee in 1931.
(2.) The documentary evidence shows that from time to time there have been difference between the trustees and the overseer as to the relative scope of their functions. Though the plaint does not in terms refer to a resolution passed by the Devasthanam Committee in August, 1933, it is clear from paragraph 6 of the plaint that it is the arrangement brought about by that resolution that led to the institution of the suit. The point for decision practically reduces itself to this: whether the Devasthanam Committee in the exercise of their powers under Act XX of 1863 were justified in defining the duties of the first defendant's office in the terms mentioned in the said resolution. The learned City Civil Judge was of opinion that the Committee were not justified in so declaring the functions of the first defendant, that in effect the resolution of the Committee amounts to a limitation of the powers of the trustees or the promotion of the first defendant to the position of a trustee jointly with the existing trustees and that the Committee were wrong in coming to the conclusion that the overseer was entitled to a third key. He accordingly granted an injunction in the terms prayed for. Hence this appeal by the first defendant.
(3.) We may observe at the outset that instead of restricting the trial to the narrow question as above suggested, the learned City Civil Judge, apparently in view of certain incidental statements in the plaint and in the written statement, raised the first part of the first issue in very wide terms and, in various portions of his judgment, he has dealt with the suit as if he had been called upon to decide whether the first defendant was entitled to joint management of the temple and its properties with the trustees. It would have been better if he had restricted himself to the second part of the first issue. We prefer to restrict our judgment to that question, because there is no denying the fact that this temple has been under a kind of management not altogether common in this presidency, the institution of an overseer being peculiar to this temple. No useful purpose will be served by attempting to determine the exact status of the first defendant relatively to the trustees or by using language importing any idea of superiority or inferiority.