PT AMBA SHANKAR Vs. MTSEOTI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application for revision directed against an order, passed by the learned District Judge of Agra, purporting to reject the applicant's appeal to his Court in circumstances which are as. follows:

(2.) The applicant instituted a suit in forma pauperis in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Agra. The suit was dismissed on the merits, and the applicant became liable to pay a sum of Rs. 205 to the-Government under Order 33, Rule 11, Civil P.C. The sum included the court-fee-payable on the plaint and some other costs said to have been incurred by the Government, probably, in opposing the- application for leave to sue as a pauper. He preferred an appeal in the Court of the District Judge, and applied for leave to appeal as a pauper. His applications was dismissed and time was given to him for payment of the court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal. The applicant paid the full court-fee due on appeal, and his appeal was registered. Three months later the District Judge received a communication from the Collector to the effect; that a sum of Rs. 205 was due to the Government in respect of the court-fee payable in the Court of the first instance-and certain costs which had not been, paid. The Collector requested the Judge to order the applicant to pay Rs. 205 as a prerequisite to the appeal being heard Reliance was placed upon Order 33, Rule 15, Civil P.C. which was expressly mentioned in the collector's letter. The District Judge expressed the opinion that Order 33, Rule 15, Civil P.C., was not applicable, but he had held that: There is no impediment to my making an order for payment of this court-fee under Order 33, Rule 12, Civil P.C.

(3.) Accordingly the learned Judge directed the applicant to pay the sum demanded by the Collector within a certain time. This order was not complied with, and the appeal was dismissed. The applicant subsequently moved the District Judge to restore the appeal on condition of the sum of Rs. 205 being paid; but the District Judge, who had already dismissed the appeal, rejected this application. It is contended in revision that the order of the District Judge dismissing the appeal was without jurisdiction. Mr. Panna Lai for the opposite party has strenuously contended that, the appeal having been dismissed, the order amounts to a decree, as defined in Section 2(2), Civil P.C., and that an appeal was competent. He goes on to contend that, as the applicant could have preferred a second appeal, no revision under Section 115, Civil P.C., can lie. In my opinion, the order of the District Judge, dismissing the appeal in the circumstances already stated, does not amount to a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2), Civil P.C. The disposal of a suit or an appeal amounts to a decree if there is an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit or appeal. Rejection of a plaint also amounts to a decree. It is argued that, in so far as the learned Judge, rightly or wrongly, rejected the memorandum of appeal on nonpayment of the court-fee payable in the trial Court, the order amounts to a rejection of the memorandum of appeal and is, therefore, a decree. It seems to me that the rejection, referred to in the definition of decree, is such rejection as is permissible under the Civil P. C.. The entire scheme of the Code leaves no doubt that two kinds of termination of a suit or appeal are contemplated. Where a suit or appeal is tried and is disposed of on the merits, the Court adjudicating on all or some of the points in controversy, the disposal amounts to a decree. Secondly, in certain cases a suit or appeal may terminate without an adjudication of all or any of the controversies between the parties. Those cases are mentioned in Order 7, Rule 11, Civil P.C. It provides that a plaint shall be rejected, inter alia, on the ground that the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp paper I within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so. There may possibly be other cases in which the Court is empowered to reject a plaint so as to terminate the suit. If the plaint is rejected on one of such grounds, the order rejecting the plaint is a decree as defined in the Civil Procedure Code. It is, however, perfectly clear that, before an order can amount to such rejection as is contemplated by Section 2(2), Civil P.C., it must be rejection authorized by some provision of the Civil P. C.. If the plaint is rejected for a cause for which the Coda-does not empower the Court to do so, it will not be a decree, as defined in the Civil Procedure Code, even though the Court may use the word reject in disposing of the suit. What can be done by a Court of first instance in reference to a plaint may also be done by a Court of appeal as1 regards the memorandum of appeal. This is plainly the effect of Section 107, Civil P.C.