INAYAT KHAN Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Court of the Judicial Committee, North-West Frontier Province, dated 19 June 1935, which confirmed a judgment of the Court of the Sessions Judge, Peshawar, finding the appellant guilty of murder and sentencing him to death. The ground upon which special leave to appeal was granted and upon which the argument upon this appeal was rested was that there was such a wrongful admission of evidence in the Courts below and such a consequent miscarriage of justice as to justify and require the interference of His Majesty. The principles upon which His Majesty will intervene in such matters and which will guide this Board in tendering advise to His Majesty in this regard have been frequently stated and are not in doubt. Their Lordships do not constitute a Court of Criminal Appeal. Their functions are thus defined in the judgment delivered by Lord Haldane in Dal Singh V/s. King-Emperor, 1917 PC 25 at p. 140 :

(2.) The general principle is established that the Sovereign in Council does not act, in the exercise of the prerogative right to review the course of justice in criminal cases in the free fashion of a fully constituted Court of Criminal Appeal. The exercise of the prerogative takes place only where it is shown that injustice of a serious and substantial character has occurred. A mere mistake on the part of the Court below, as for example, in the admission of improper evidence, will not suffice if it has not led to injustice of a grave character. Nor do the Judicial Committee advise interference merely because they themselves would have taken a different view of evidence admitted. Such questions are, as a general rule, treated as being for the final decision of the Courts below.

(3.) The matter was thus stated by Lord Weston in In re Dillet, (1887) 12 AC 459 at p. 467 : The rule has been repeatedly laid down, and has been invariably followed, that Her Majesty will not review or interfere with the course of criminal proceedings, unless it is shown that, by a disregard of the forms of legal process, or by some violation of the principles of natural justice, or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done.