MAHARAJA KUMAR RAMRANBIJAI PRASAD SINGH Vs. DEOKI AHIR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiff-appellant, the Maharaja of Dumraon, instituted, in March 1929, 28 suits to eject tenants of land in Jaunhi Diara. The defendants had been inducted on to the land under registered kabuliats for a term; in each case the term was for seven years. At the time when the kabuliats were executed the demised land was in the district of Ballia in the United Provinces. Owing to a change in the course of the deep stream of the river Ganges in November 1926, the land became part of the district of Shahabad in this province. Up to 7th September 1926 the tenancy law governing the land was the United Provinces Act, 2 of 1901. On 7 September 1926, a new Act (The Agra Tenancy Act, 3 of 1926) came into operation and the Act of 1901 was repealed. Under the Act of 1901 the defendants in the present suit were non-occupancy tenants liable to be ejected by the landlord on the expiry of the term of their leases. Under the new Act of 1926 it is contended on behalf of the defendants that they have acquired the status of statutory tenants within the meaning of Section 19 of that Act, and, therefore, the landlord is not entitled to possession of the demised lands during the lifetime of the tenants and five years thereafter.

(2.) The only question that has been argued by Mr. S.M. Mullick, who appeared for the appellant in the majority of the cases, and whose arguments have been adopted by the learned advocates appearing in the remaining cases, is whether the decision of the Court below that the defendants have acquired the rights of statutory tenants within the meaning of Section 19, Agra Tenancy Act, 3 of 1926, is correct or not It may be mentioned, however, that it has been found by the Courts below in some of the suits out of which these appeals have arisen that the defendants have acquired occupancy rights in the land; and in some of the suits it was also found that the plaintiff's right to recover possession was barred by limitation. With regard to the question that was argued by Mr. S.M. Mullick, namely the status of the defendants, it is contended that Section 19 of Act 3 of 1926 has no retrospective effect and, therefore, that the rights which the plaintiff had up to the time of the passing of that Act are not affected by the Act. In the present case the right which is alleged to have been affected is the right of the Maharaja to recover possession of the land on the expiry of the terms of the leases, which right was expressly mentioned in the kabuliats. The argument, in my opinion, reveals a confusion of thought about the meaning of the word "retrospective" as applied to statutory provisions. The meaning of this term was considered in West V/s. Gwynne (1911) 2 Ch D 1 by Buckley, L.J. in a case which arose under Section 3, of the Conveyancing Act of 1892. That section provided that in all leases containing a restriction against alienation without the consent of the lessor it should be deemed that there was a proviso to the effect that no fine, or sum of money in the nature of a fine, should be payable for or in respect of such consent. It was argued in that case that this section did not have retrospective effect and, therefore, that the statutory proviso could not be read into leases which had been executed before the Conveyancing Act of 1892 came into operation. With regard to the argument Buckley, L.J. said: During the argument the words retrospective and retroactive have been repeatedly used, and the question has been stated to be whether Sec. 3 of the Conveyancing Act, 1892, is retrospective. To my mind the word retrospective is inappropriate, and the question is not whether the section is retrospective. Retrospective operation is one matter, interference with existing rights is another. If an Act provides that as at a past date the law shall be taken to have been that which it was not, that Act I understand to be retrospective. That is not this case. The question here is whether a certain provision as to the contents of leases is addressed to the case of all leases or only of some, namely leases executed after the passing of the Act. The question is as to the ambit and scope of the Act, and not as to the date as from which the new law, as enacted by the Act, is to be taken to have been the law.

(3.) Now in the cases before us, at the time when the Act of 1901 ceased to operate and the new Tenancy Act of 1926 came into operation, the lessor had not the right to present possession of the lands. That was a right which would, in due course, have accrued to him, but it was not a right which he had at the time when the new Act came into force. The new Act has not taken away any right which he had in the past, that is to say, before the Act of 1926 came into operation, or which he had at the moment when that Act came into operation. It has merely taken away a right which would have accrued to him in due time but which had not in fact then accrued. In this view of the matter, it seems to me that the argument with regard to the "retrospective effect" of the statute is irrelevant in the present case. Nor can I find anything in the statute to indicate that it was intended to have the effect contended for, namely, to leave untouched the position of landlords whose lands were held on leases at the time the Act of 1926 came into operation. The material portion of Section 19 is as follows: Subject to the provisions of Sub-section 3 of Section 8, every person who is, at the commencement of this Act, a tenant of land (other than land of certain specified character) not being a permanent tenure-holder or a tenant, with a right of occupancy or a tenant holding from a permanent tenure-holder, shall be called a statutory tenant and, subject to the provisions of this Act, shall be entitled to a life-tenancy of his holding.