(1.) These are appeals by the Crown Prosecutor against the orders of the Second Presidency Magistrate, Madras, acquitting the accused of offences punishable under Secs.45 and 46 of the Madras City Police Act (III of 1888).
(2.) On information laid before him that a common gaming house was being kept on the premises No. 40, Cemetery Road, Royapuram, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, who is a Justice of the Peace for the town of Madras, issued a warrant (Ex. A) on 24 October, 1935, to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Royapuram H-2 Station, authorising him to enter the said premises and to take into custody persons found therein and to seize all instruments of gaming, etc. P.W. 1 the Sub-Inspector of Royapuram Police Station referred to in Ex. A accordingly went to the house in question and seized several articles. The accused and others who were found there were arrested and charges under Secs.45 and 46 of the Madras City Police Act were laid against them. The tenant of the house was charged under Section 45 of the Act in the one case, and the others were charged under Section 46. The learned Presidency Magistrate holding that as the warrant of arrest, Ex. A was not a valid warrant, the presumption mentioned in Section 43 of the Act could not be raised, and as there was no other evidence that the house was used as a common gaming house, acquitted the accused; hence this appeal by the Crown.
(3.) The only question that is argued before me is that relating to the validity of Ex. A and to the presumption that could be raised under Section 43. Ex. A is on a printed form, the heading of which is "warrant for search of gaming house and arrest of persons found therein". And it proceeds: Whereas information has this day been laid before the undersigned Assistant Commissioner of Police and Justice of the Peace for the town of Madras, that a common gaming house is kept on the premises etc. And it is signed by Mr. G. Rangaswami, as Assistant Commissioner of Police and Justice of the Peace. There is no dispute about the authority of the person who signed it to issue a warrant under Section 42 of the Act. What is argued is (1) that it does not purport to be one issued under Section 42 of the Act, and (2) that it does not state that the Assistant Commissioner who issued it had reason to believe that a common gaming house was kept on the premises in question and that therefore it is not a valid warrant on the strength of which the presumption mentioned in Section 43 could be raised. It is true that it is not specifically stated in the warrant that it was issued under Section 42 of the Act. But there can be no doubt that it was issued only under Section 42, for the heading of the warrant, as already observed, is that it was for the search of gaming house and arrest of persons found therein, and the form used clearly shows that it is one meant for the purpose referred to in Section 42. There is therefore no force in this contention. The next objection, as already observed, is that it does not state that the Assistant Commissioner "had reason to believe" that a common gaming house was kept on the premises in question. There is nothing in the Act which lays down that it should be stated in the warrant that the Commissioner who issued it has reason to believe "that a common gaming house is kept on the premises." All that Section 42 lays down is: If the Commissioner has reason to believe that any enclosed place or building is used as a common gaming house he may issue his warrant, etc.