S M DESOUZA Vs. SECYOF STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In my judgment this appeal fails both on the preliminary objection which Mr. Sinha raises on behalf of the Crown and also on merits. The objector before the learned Judge in the Court below was S.M. DeSouza. In his evidence he stated in cross-examination that the land which was the subject matter of the land acquisition proceedings, from which this is an appeal, belonged to his mother; that is to say, his mother was the recorded tenant. The land is governed by the Central Provinces Tenancy Act. Now it is quite clear that, if the land belonged to the mother of the present appellant, the present appellant had no locus standi, and it is somewhat difficult to understand why the Crown treated with the objector in those circumstances. Mr. Yunus contends on behalf of the appellant that he has an interest in the land within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, and bases his contention on the provisions of Section 47, Central Provinces Tenancy Act. Under that section as heir of his mother he would be entitled to be placed in possession of the holding in the event of his mother alienating the property against the provisions of Section 46 of the Act. Section 46 is a general provision which prohibits the transfer by an occupancy tenant of his holding. In my judgment the contention fails. Section 47 gives the heir a bare right to be put into possession by the Revenue Officer and is an exception to the general rule, but creates no interest in the heir under the general rule. It is clear therefore that the present appellant has no interest in the land within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act.

(2.) Apart from the preliminary objection which, in my opinion, as I have already stated, succeeds, the appeal itself has no merits. The land is a part of a larger area of 1.45 acres. The mother of the appellant is interested in 77 acres being, plot No. 1249/1. In this case the appellant's contention in the Court below as well as in this Court was that the land should be valued on the footing of it being a building land. Now to that end it would be necessary to value the land upon a purely speculative basis, namely, on the supposition that the landlord would give consent to the use of the land for building, as it is admitted by the appellant that he has no present right to use the land for building purposes; and, under the Tenancy Act, if it were used for that purpose, the recorded tenant would be liable to ejectment at the instance of the landlord. A body of evidence was called to show that certain plots of land surrounding the land in dispute or nearby were sold at substantial prices for building purposes. But in cross-examination one of the witnesses Debendra Nath Bose (witness 2 for the objector) admitted that the land referred to was Nazool land, that is to say, land owned by Government. Now whatever the exact meaning to be placed upon the expression "Nazool" may be, it is admitted by Mr. Yunus on behalf of the appellant that this land is not Nazool land, that it is agricultural land, that it cannot be built upon as I have already stated and cannot be alienated. The compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector was Rs. 11 to the objector and 11 annas to Rajendra Singh, the landlord. In my opinion there is no foundation for that argument. The land must be valued upon the basis of its present use; and it is not seriously contended in those circumstances that the valuation placed by the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector is not correct. For those reasons in my judgment the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. Fazl Ali, J.

(3.) I agree.