R T RANGACHARI Vs. SECRETARY OF STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is the appeal of the plaintiff in the action against a decree of the High Court of Madras, in its appellate jurisdiction, dismissing an appeal against a decree of the High Court in its original jurisdiction whereby the action of the plaintiff had been dismissed and judgment had been entered for the defendant. The facts giving rise to the litigation are as follows: Prior to and in the mon July, 1927, the appellant was a Sub-Inspector of Police in the Presidency of Madras. Certain charges of irregular and improper conduct in the execution of his duties as a Police Officer were made against him and were the subject of an official inquiry conducted by a Mr. Charsley, an Assistant Superintendent of Police for the district in which the appellant was serving. This inquiry was held in the manner required by R. 14 of the Statutory Rules, 1924, Nos. 354 and 355 (the Civil Services Classification Rules), made under S. 96-B (2), Government of India Act, 1919. Mr. Charsley had concluded his inquiry on 7 September. At that date the Acting District Superintendent of Police was a Mr. Kalimullah who had taken charge of the District in August and continued in charge until the latter part of October, when he was succeeded by a Mr. Loveluck. The appellant had for sometime prior to 7 September been in bad health and on that date when Mr. Charsley finished the inquiry the appellant had applied to him in the following terms: I beg to submit that I am growing worse with my hernia and I am unfit for further service. I pray that I may kindly be placed before the District Medical Officer for being invalid.

(2.) This request was transmitted to Mr. Kalimullah by Mr. Charsley with a statement that: He (the appellant) may be sent before the District Medical Officer with a requisition. It appears to be true that he has a bad rupture. I have completed the inquiry against him. On 9 September there was an important conference between Mr. Charsley and Mr. Kalimullah as to the course to be adopted with regard to the appellant. The result seems to their Lordships to be now quite clear and their Lordships agree with the findings of both Courts below which are in substantial agreement in all material respects. Two courses were under consideration: disciplinary action such as dismissal on the one hand and on the other retirement for health reasons on pension. Mr. Charsley's view was adverse to the appellant and he thought that the charges were established and so informed Mr. Kalimullah, but he recognized, as was the fact, that the decision rested with Mr. Kalimullah and not with him. Mr. Kalimullah, after giving the matter careful consideration and after full discussion with Mr. Charsley, arrived, in all good faith, as both Courts have found, at the decision that the evidence was doubtful and inconclusive and that the charges should be dropped and that accordingly the appellant, subject to a medical certificate, which on the known facts it was anticipated would be granted, should be allowed to retire on grounds of health and that an invalid pension should be awarded to him. There is no dispute that Mr. Kalimullah was fully competent so to drop the charges and to come to the determination to which both Courts have found that he did come with perfect honesty. Mr. Charsley quite properly bowed to the decision though safeguarding himself with a statement that he would send in his report. He did so on 2 October, and like the view he orally expressed on 9 September it was adverse to the appellant. Meanwhile on 16 September a medical certificate was granted and on 13 October the pension roll was signed by Mr. Moore, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, sanctioning the granting of an invalid pension of Rs. 41 a month, and on 4 November the appropriate authorization for payment of the pension to date from 17 September was issued from the office of the Accountant-General. Mr. Moore had been told by Mr. Charsley on 9 September about the charges against the appellant and of Mr. Kalimullah's view that he should nevertheless be invalided out of the service. The appellant in fact retired from the service and his pension was paid to him for the months of September, October and November. The trouble which arose with regard to it subsequently was due to the following circumstances: Mr. Charsley's report had been put aside in the office and not brought before Mr. Kalimullah by his subordinates. Had it been so brought before him there is no probability that he would have altered the decision or the course of action upon which he had determined upon the same material on 9 September, but he might, and apparently ought to have made a record of his decision in respect of the report and this he did not do. Accordingly, when he went out of office and Mr. Loveluck succeeded him and saw the report, there was not unnaturally both suspicion and trouble. The adverse view of Mr. Charsley in writing was given more weight than the unrecorded reasons of Mr. Kalimullah for forming a more lenient and more cautious judgment as to the extent to which the charges made could be or were supported by reliable evidence. The view taken was that the report ought to have been put before the Pensions Authorities or before the Deputy Inspector-General who was asked to authorise the pension. Their Lordships are not in a position to say whether this view is correct as a matter of departmental practice, but it is clear that if there was a neglect of proper procedure it was not due to any want of good faith. As has been already stated, the then Deputy Inspector General, Mr. Moore, was told, according to Mr. Charsley, of his enquiry and of his view of the matter and of his proposed report. This, however, was not so plain at the time as it has now become and indeed was probably unknown to Mr. Loveluck who succeeded Mr. Kalimullah and to Mr. Filson who by this time had succeeded Mr. Moore. The upshot was that the pension was first suspended for further consideration and that on 28 February 1928 Mr. Filson issued an order purporting to remove the appellant from the service from the date upon which he was invalided. The grant of pension was also annulled or put an end to. The appellant memoralized the Government of Madras against this decision basing his prayer for relief from the cancellation of the order stopping his pension upon the simple ground that the matter had been decided by a competent authority and could not be re-opened. There was a discussion at the time whether the appellant's proper procedure under the rules should not have been by appeal rather than by memorial, but on the argument before their Lordships no point was made of this and it was agreed that the substantial matter was brought before Government by the appellant's memorial and that relief was refused and that a further memorial to the Government of India was withheld by the Madras Government pursuant to a discretion vested in it by the material rules. The present action was then brought.

(3.) The first question is, has the appellant suffered a wrong, that is to say is his complaint well founded in fact ? If it is, then a second question arises, namely, is the wrong actionable and ought the appellant to have succeeded in this action? The answer to the first question seems to their Lordships plainly to be in the affirmative. It is not contended that R. 351 of the Pensions Rules relating to conduct had any bearing on the matter or justified withdrawal of the pension. But their Lordships appreciate that for reasons which have already been indicated, irregularity or slackness of procedure may have given rise to suspicions of good faith which the investigation of the subject in this action has, or ought to have, entirely removed. In these circumstances the case becomes a case in which after Government officials duly competent and duly authorized in that behalf have arrived honestly at one decision, their successors in office, after the decision has been acted upon and is in effective operation, purport to enter upon a reconsideration of the matter and to arrive at another and totally different decision. It seems to require no demonstration that an order purporting to remove the appellant from the service at a time when, as their Lordships hold, he had for some months duly and properly ceased to be in the service, was a mere nullity and cannot be sustained. It follows that in their Lordships' view the appellant had, and has, every right to complain of the stoppage of the pension as a breach of the rules relating to pensions. Both Courts below so held and their Lordships are in entire agreement with their decision on this point.