CHANDRA KISHORE MANDAL Vs. SHASINDRA KUMAR ROY CHOUDHURY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application under Section 107, Government of India Act, against the order of the District Magistrate of 24-Pergannas declining to interfere under Rule 1-A of the Rules under the Local Self-Government Act, with the order of Mr. B. Sinha, Sadar Sub-divisional Magistrate of Alipur, rejecting the application of the petitioner Chandra Kishore Mandal for nomination as a candidate for election to membership of the Sadar Local Board, on the ground that Rule 1-A did not apply. Our interference is sought on the ground that the learned Magistrate erroneously refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law in declining to entertain the petitioner's application. Rule 1-A is as follows: All disputes arising under these rules other than objections under Rr. 15 and 42 shall be decided by the Magistrate of the district and his decision shall be final.

(2.) The application is opposed on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order inasmuch as the learned District Magistrate, acting under Rule 1-A, did not constitute a Court over which this Court has superintendence within the meaning of Section 107, Government of India Act, 1915. There can be no doubt that this Court ordinarily has superintendence over the judicial work of all Judicial Officers in so far as they are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, and there seems to be equally no doubt that the Magistrate of the District in deciding a dispute under Rule 1-A of the Rules under the Local Self-Government Act, is acting judicially. It was held in Mahendra Rahman Mia V/s. Kanti Chandra Bose that in deciding disputes under Section 26-B of the Rules as to the qualification of electors for membership of a Local Board, the District Magistrate is acting judicially. Similarly in Manindra Chandra Nandi V/s. Provas Chandra Mitter it was held that the function of a Returning Officer in deciding a question as to the eligibility of a candidate is in the nature of a judicial function and his decision is in the nature of a judicial decision. It seems clear moreover that the Magistrate of the district acting under Rule 1-A is not merely a persona designata, for the definition of Magistrate of a district contained in the Local Self-Government Act includes any Magistrate subordinate to the Magistrate of the district to whom he may delegate all or any of his powers under the Act. Thus it is clear that he is not. a persona designata, for as. such he would have no Magistrates subordinate to him. We find, therefore, that he is appointed to decide disputes under Rule 1-A of the Act in the capacity as Magistrate of the district. The same question was decided in Nara Narayan Mondal V/s. Aghore Chandra Ganguli (1935) 39 C W N 971, with reference to the District Judge acting under Secs.36- 44, Bengal Municipal Act, and though there, were different considerations to be taken into account in that case, the same reasoning applies as to the superintendence of this Court in reference to the decision of the Magistrate of the district under Rule 1-A. of the Rules under the Local. Self Government Act.

(3.) I hold, therefore, that this Court has jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of the learned Magistrate in this case, if he has clearly failed to exercise a jurisdiction that was vested in him. He appears to have considered the matter judicially and his conclusion was that he had no power to interfere as Rule 1-A did not, in his opinion, apply in view of the fact that under Rule 30 the decision of the officer appointed by him to decide the matter is final. We cannot say that his view that Rule 1-A did not apply was wrong, though it is true that if Rule 1-A does not apply in the case of final decisions under the Rules, the mention of Rule 15 in Rule 1-A is superfluous. On the other hand if the decision under a Rule is to be final there is no room for any dispute and it might be said that no dispute can arise. In any case we do not. think that the circumstances of this case are such that we should send back the case to the learned Magistrate for hearing under Rule 1-A and this is the only manner in which we could interfere with the proceedings. This Rule is accordingly discharged with costs; hearing fee two gold mohurs. Patterson, J.