RAO SAHEB MANDA APPA RAO PANTULU GARU-INTERIM TRUSTEE OF HARADAKHANDI MUTT Vs. BUDANKAYALA VIGNESAM SUBUDHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiffs lent a sum of money on a promissory note to the late mahant of the Lakshminarasimha Swami Mutt at Haradakhandi and have brought this suit against the present holders of the mutt for the recovery of the amount due. Both the lower Courts have found that the debt was not for the necessity of the mutt and was therefore not binding on the present mahant. In giving a decree against the personal property if any of the late mahant, both Courts have held that the arrears of rent due during the lifetime of the late mahant and since collected are the personal property of the late mahant and therefore liable in satisfaction of the decree. An appeal has been filed against this incidental finding, while a memorandum of cross-objections has been filed with regard to the main finding that the debt is not binding on the mutt.

(2.) Both Courts held that arrears of rent due before the late, mahant's death but not collected by him were his personal property, because of a dictum of Ramesam, J., reported in Lakshmindra Thirthaswamiar V/s. Vibhudapriya Thirthaswamiar (1922) 44 M.L.J. 187. That too was a suit against a mutt and it was held that the debt was not binding on the mutt. No issue was raised on the question whether rents uncollected would be liable for the debt and no discussion before the learned Judges seems to have taken place. Krishnan, J., makes no reference to the matter. Ramesam, J., at the very end of his judgment, says: In the result the appeal is allowed so far as the mutt properties are concerned but the plaintiff will be entitled to a decree for the suit sum against the assets of the late Swamiar in the hands of the defendant - such as y, uncollected arrears since collected or investments of the late Swami which have not been incorporated with the mutt properties.

(3.) It is contended in appeal that this dictum is not in accordance with the law on the point. Whether or no arrears not collected were the property of the late mahant depends upon the larger question as to the powers of the mahant to dispose of mutt property. This question has been considered in a very large number of cases and many of the older decisions are no longer good law. The first case that may be considered as bearing on this question is Ram Parkash Das V/s. Anand Das (1216) 31 M.L.J. 1 : L.R. 43 I.A. 73 : I.L.R. 43 Cal. 707 (P.C.) which case came up for consideration in Kesho Das V/s. Amar Dasji (1934) I.L.R. 14 Pat. 379. The latter was a case in which the applicability of Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, to the management of a mutt was considered and it was held that this section did apply and that although the mahant was not a trustee in the legal sense of the word, yet he was a trustee in a general sense for the proper administration of the mutt and its property. At page 385 is an extract taken from the earlier case Ram Parkash Das V/s. Anand Das (1216) 31 M.L.J. 1 : L.R. 43 I.A. 73 : I.L.R. 43 Cal. 707 (P.C.): This practice (of succession by Chela to Mahant) is ascetic; it involves a separation from all worldly wealth and ties, and a self-dedication to the services and rites of the asthal...this property is held by the mahant as its owner, and the succession to him in such property follows with the succession to the office. The nature of the ownership is, as has been said, an ownership in trust for the mutt or institution itself, and it must not be forgotten that although large administrative powers are undoubtedly vested in the reigning mahant, this trust does exist, and that it must be respected.