JESSORE DISTRICT BOARD Vs. SURENDRA NATH HALDAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal on behalf of the Jessore District Board which figured as defendant 1 in a suit commenced by the plaintiff for a declaration that a certain resolution of the Finance Committee and adopted by the District Board was illegal and ultra vires of the latter. The resolution was passed on 18 January 1930 and sanctioned a sum of Rs. 3,000 for purposes of a propaganda work to be carried on for the welfare of Union Committees, wherever necessary, the Chairman being authorized to spend the money by appointing workers or in such other way as he deemed proper. The propaganda was necessary in the opinion of the District Board in view of an anti-Union propaganda started at Bandabila and other places, and the plaintiff's case was that the District Board had absolutely no authority to spend any money for this purpose. He prayed for a perpetual injunction restraining defendant 1 from spending any money in pursuance of the said resolution, and there was a prayer also for refund to the district fund of any amount that might have been already spent. The defence inter alia was that the District Board was perfectly entitled under the law to sanction the amount for the purpose alleged, and out of the amount voted only Rs. 400 was actually spent at the date when a temporary injunction was issued. The other questions raised are not material to the present appeal. The plaintiff's suit was decreed in substance by both the Courts below. The resolution, was held to be ultra vires and the injunction prayed for was granted. The prayer for refund of the money already spent was however negatived.

(2.) It is against this decision of the District Judge, Jessore, confirming the decision of the Subordinate Judge, that the present appeal has been preferred, and Mr. Gupta who has appeared for the appellant District Board has raised a two-fold contention. His first contention is that the lower Courts were wrong in the view that they had taken viz., that money could not be spent for any purpose other than those specified in Section 53, Local Self Government Act. He argues that a corporate body has not only the powers which are expressly conferred upon it by statute but can also exercise the powers which are regarded as incidental to or consequential upon those things which the Legislature has authorized. Expenditure of money for a propaganda work to maintain the existence of the Union Boards is, according to Mr. Gupta, a justifiable expenditure though it is not specifically mentioned in Section 53, Local Self-Government Act, which should not be taken as exhaustive. Mr. Gupta would read Section 53 as. not laying down the purposes for which alone the District Board can spend the District Fund. It simply enumerates the compulsory expenses, and does not limit or restrict the powers of the District Board to spend money, for purposes coming expressly or impliedly within the scope of its duties. The second contention of Mr. Gupta is that even if there is any deviation from the Act, it is cured by the provision of Section 53-A, Local Self-Government Act. Now on the first point we agree with Mr. Gupta that the powers of a body corporate are not confined to what is expressly stated in the Act, but extend to what is necessary and properly required for carrying into effect the undertakings and works which the Act has expressly sanctioned. As Brice puts it: A corporation has all the capacities for engaging in transactions which are impliedly given to it by reasonable implication from the language of the constating instruments. (Brice, Edn. 2, Oh. 5, p. 66).

(3.) The proposition is well settled by a series of decisions of the English Courts, the leading case being Attorney-General V/s. Great Eastern Railway Co. (1880) 5 A C 473 where Lord Selborne, L.C. observed as follows: I agree with L.J. James, that the doctrine ought to be reasonably and not unreasonably understood and applied and that whatever may fairly be regarded as incidental to or consequent upon those things which the legislature has authorized, ought not (unless expressly prohibited) to be held by judicial construction to be ultra vires.