JASNAMI Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application in revision from an order of the Sessions Judge upholding the conviction of the accused persons under Section 153, I.P.C., and the sentences of fine imposed on them. It appears that the accused are Doms by caste who have recently become Aryasamajists. There has been a practice in some hill villages not to allow marriage processions with palanquins and dandies occupied by the bridegroom and the bride to pass through village sites. The high caste Hindus had on previous occasions objected to such actions. Indeed the present accused took out such a procession on 16 November 1933, which was obstructed and had to be postponed till 22 December, 1933, when the present occurrence took place. The Secretary of the local Depressed Classes Association submitted an application to the Deputy Commissioner stating that on the previous occasion, namely on 16 November 1933, the marriage party had been intercepted and looted on the way by high caste Hindus and that the very marriage was to take place on 22 December, 1933, and it was just possible that the marriage party might be disturbed on the way. He therefore prayed that police arrangements should be made for their safe passage. The Deputy Commissioner ordered: If they want regular police, they cannot have them; they may have no protection if they want to go through villages on conveyances If they are molested on the public way, the assailants will be prosecuted.

(2.) The Deputy Commissioner apparently declined to grant the processionists the protection of the police if they insisted on going through the villages on conveyances, but offered them protection if they were molested while going along a public road. The order contained no prohibition against their going on conveyances through the villages, but merely contained an intimation that they should not in such an event expect protection by the police. The qanungo and patwari were later directed to be present on the 22 December, and to prevent a breach of: the peace. The accused took out a marriage procession on that day and when an objection was raised by the residents of another village both sides came to an agreement and the palanquins were allowed to go unoccupied while passing through the village. But the processionists entered the village of the bride and carried the bridegroom in the palanquin during the night time, when the villagers did not see the passengers. So no disturbance took place. But on 23 December 1933 the marriage procession started from the house of the bride at 10 o clock in the morning and there was an objection raised by the high caste Hindus of the village that the palanquins should be carried empty.

(3.) The qanungo, accompanied by the patwari, intervened and ordered that the palanquins should be carried empty. This order was not obeyed and the accused forcibly put the bridegroom and the bride into the palanquins and carried them through the village sites. They were then prosecuted for an offence under Section 153, I.P.C., on the allegation that they made the bride and the bridegroom to be carried in conveyances through the inhabited area of the village contrary to the custom of the locality. Both the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that there was a local practice against such conduct. They also thought that the qanungo was empowered under Section 31, Police Act, to issue the order for the purpose of maintaining law and order, and acted in good faith in "trying to preserve peace. When the matter came up in revision before a learned Judge of this Court he felt some doubt as to the power of a Police Officer to prevent a person from doing what would ordinarily be considered to be a legal act though on a public thoroughfare, and has therefore referred the case to us. Now it has to be conceded that Section 153, I.P.C., cannot possibly apply unless there has been "doing anything which is illegal". If the act done is illegal then, if the other conditions laid down in the section are fulfilled, the case would be governed by it. One has therefore to see whether the act of the accused in [taking out the bride and the bridegroom in palanquins through the village site was an illegal act. Now no civil Court has held that there is any such village custom having the force of law which prevents people from going over village sites in palanquins or dandies. It may well be doubted whether such a custom can ever be recognised by a Court of law. There is accordingly no finding that the accused committed an illegal act because they acted in defiance of any such custom having the force of law.