CHUNI LAL Vs. RAM RANVIJOY PRASAD SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These four applications in revision are directed against a decision of the District Judge of Shahabad where by that officer dismissed four appeals of the four petitioners from the orders of the Munsif of Buxar, refusing to set aside the sale of a certain holding in execution of a decree of the Maharaja of Dumraon. It appears that the holding in question was sold on 7 May 1932. On the 23 of that month one of the judgment debtors applied for setting aside the sale under Order 21, Rule 89 and deposited a certain amount of money on the 25th. The sale was set aside on 7 June 1932. On 1 July the opposite party in this case, namely, the auction-purchaser, Lakhan Ojha, filed an application objecting to the setting, aside of the sale on the ground that the entire amount required to be deposited under the law was not deposited and therefore the sale could not be set aside. The learned Munsif overruled this objection and rejected the application of the auction purchaser. This order was upheld in appeal by the District Judge of Shahabad, but on an application for revision filed by the auction-purchaser in this Court the order of the lower Court was set aside on 7 April 1934, and the sale was confirmed. Thereafter four applications for setting aside the sale were filed on behalf of the four petitioners under Order 21, Rule 90. One of the petitioners is a judgment- debtor and the other three claim to have interest in the holding sold. The cases were heard by two Munsifs.

(2.) The cases of Chuni (petitioner in Civil Revision No. 11 of 1936) and Chandrika Ahir (petitioner in Civil Revision No. 55) were heard by Babu Bhagwan Prasad, the Munsif of Buxar, and the other two cases, namely, those of Ram Asharfi Ojha (petitioner in Civil Revision No. 53) and Lal Mohan Ojha (petitioner in Civil Revision No. 54) were heard by his successor Babu Jugal Kishore Prasad. Both the learned Munsifs dismissed the applications. The petitions were obviously filed long after the expiry of the period of limitation and it seems that the petitioners relied apparently upon Section 14, Lim. Act, and contended that on account of the fraudulent suppression of the various processes the knowledge of the sale was kept back from them and that the applications were within thirty days of the date of knowledge. Babu Bhagwan Prasad held that there was proper service of the processes and that the two petitioners whose cases he decided had knowledge of the sale. Babu Jugal Kishore Prasad, on the other hand, held that the processes were not served but nevertheless he held that the petitioners before him had knowledge of the execution proceedings and of the sale. All the petitioners preferred appeals to the District Judge who dismissed them by one single judgment against which these four applications for revision have been filed.

(3.) The learned District Judge agreed with Babu Jugal Kishore Prasad and held that the processes were not served, but he also agreed with him in holding that the petitioners had full knowledge of the execution proceedings and, therefore, the applications were barred by limitation. It was contended before him that the period of limitation commenced to run from the date when this Court confirmed the sale. He overruled this contention. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the opposite party to the effect that under the circumstances stated above no revision lies. It has been contended on his behalf by Mr. Jayaswal that assuming that the learned District Judge has come to wrong conclusions about the applications being barred by limitation, that erroneous decision is not open to revision by this Court. The argument of Mr. Mahabir Prasad on behalf of the applicants is this. He has, first of all, contended that the learned District Judge has wrongly used the findings of Babu Jugal Kishore Prasad also in the two cases which were decided by Babu Bhag wan Prasad and this he had no jurisdiction to do, or at any rate this was a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction and therefore a revision lies. There is, in my opinion, no force in this contention. What seems to me on a careful reading of the judgment of the learned District Judge is that he has adopted the reasons given by Babu Jugal Kishore Prasad as his own reasons for holding that all the applicants had knowledge of the sale. After referring to the views of Babu Jugal Kishore Prasad he says: On the evidence therefore coupled with the circumstances, I have no hesitation in holding that the allegation of the applicants regarding their ignorance of the date of sale is not correct. They knew from before that the date of sale was 7 May 1932. Limitation therefore would run from that date in respect of the applications for setting aside the sale.