(1.) The appellant kept a sum of Rs. 2,880 in fixed deposit with the respondent Bank. By a notice of withdrawal served on the Bank, the deposit became repayable on 20 June 1932. The Bank having failed to pay the money he instituted a suit for the recovery of his deposit against the bank on 16 March 1933. An arrangement having been proposed between the Bank and its depositors, this Court, on its Original Side on the application of the Bank under Section 153, Companies Act, ordered a meeting of the depositors to be called on 9 May 1933. On 28 May 1933, the majority, in number representing three-fourths in value of the depositors, agreed to a scheme the terms of which, so far as they are relevant for the purposes of the present appeal, are as follows: (1) That the depositors shall not be entitled to demand payment of their deposit money or interest at once and shall be paid only in terms of the scheme. (2) That notwithstanding any contract previously made with the depositors the Company will, during the continuance of this scheme, pay interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum, with effect from 1 Baisakh 1339 B.S. on the amount of the principal as shown in the books of the Company as on 31 Chaitra 1338 B.S. irrespective of any classification of deposit. (3) That the scheme of arrangement will continue till the 30 Chaitra 1348 B.S., but the Board of Directors to be constituted under this scheme shall be competent, if they find that the scheme is not working satisfactorily to discontinue the same provided the majority of the depositors and shareholders, in a joint meeting specially convened for the purpose, sanction the discontinuance of the same....
(2.) On 27 June 1933 the appellant's suit for recovery of his money was decreed in terms of a compromise by which the appellant gave up his claim to the extent of Rs. 210 and the bank agreed to pay off the balance in 15 instalments payable from September 1933 to 1937. On 18 August 1933 this Court sanctioned the scheme. Two instalments were paid there after by the Bank in September a December, 1933 in pursuance of the consent decree. The Bank having defaulted to pay the remaining instalments according to the terms of the consent decree, the appellant filed an application for execution of the consent decree on 8 June 1935. The Bank opposed the execution of the decree on the ground that the scheme as sanctioned by this Court was binding on the appellant. The Courts below have come to the conclusion that the appellant was one of the depositors who at a meeting of the depositors called by this Court under Section 153, Companies Act, agreed to the scheme set up by the bank and that a notice of the meeting was actually served on the appellant. They accordingly gave effect to the bank's objection to the execution of the decree and dismissed the appellant's application for execution. The decree-holder appeals to this Court.
(3.) The only point for determination in this appeal is whether the scheme which was sanctioned by this Court is binding on the appellant. The decision of this point will depend on the question whether the appellant comes under the word depositors as mentioned in the scheme. The learned advocate appearing for the bank contends that in the absence of any special meaning attached to the word "depositors" its dictionary meaning should be given to it and that as the word "depositors" means persons whose names are in the deposit roll of the Bank, the appellant comes under this category irrespective of the question whether his deposit had become repayable and whether he had instituted a suit before the scheme was embarked upon. The learned advocate for the appellant, however, contends that the word "depositors" does not mean those whose deposits had already matured and who had already incurred expenses by instituting suits for recovery of their deposits. It is argued by him that the appellant comes under a different category from depositors whose deposits have not yet matured, inasmuch as he had a vested cause of action before the scheme was embarked upon and that his rights are entirely dissimilar to the rights of those depositors whose deposits have not yet matured, inasmuch as the latter are deeply interested in opposing the payment by the bank to the appellant immediately. In view of the peculiar facts of this case, however, we express no opinion on the contention of the learned advocate for the appellant, namely whether a depositor ceases to be a depositor after his deposit has matured and after he has instituted a suit for recovery of the deposit. It is admitted by the learned advocate appearing for the Bank that in the petition which was filed by the Bank under Section 153 of the Act the depositors whose deposits had already matured and who had already instituted suits for recovery of the deposits were not specifically mentioned. The learned advocate, however, contends that the word "depositors" in the petition under Section 153, and also in the preliminary order directing a meeting of the depositors to be held, must have included depositors whose money had become payable and who had already instituted suits for recovery of their deposits, inasmuch as in fact a notice of the meeting was served on the appellant. The finding of the trial Judge on this point is as follows: As regards the service of notice of the depositors having deposit of more than Re. 1 in the Bank there is the testimony of the Officiating Secretary of the Bank to the effect that he got a list of such depositors prepared, had such list verified on comparison with the list of such depositors shown in the ledger book of the company, had notices issued on such depositors through post and got the certificates of posting from the postal authorities. No doubt the said certificates are not filed on the allegations that they with other material papers were filed before the High Court in connexion with the application for securing the final sanction to the scheme proposed by the authorities of the bank in consultation with the majority of the depositors in a meeting as directed by the High Court, but it is clear from the order of the latter Court that it was only satisfied as to the genuineness and validity of the service and ultimately sanctioned the scheme. No valid reason is forthcoming why the authorities of the Bank should bear any special grudge against the present decree-holder and studiously refrain from issuing a notice on him apprehending that a valid service of notice on him will raise insurmountable difficulties in the way of getting the proposed scheme ultimately sanctioned. I see no valid reason to disbelieve the Secretary who has deposed to the effect that he can say on oath that the name of not a single depositor was excluded from the list prepared by him for service of notices.