LAKHAN Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application in revision from an order convicting the accused who is the mukhia of a village under Section 177, I.P.C. On 5 July 1934, he signed a panchayatnama in the capacity of a mukhia which was to the effect that one Mt. Rajrani had died by having been drowned in the Jumna a day before. This panchayatnama was sent to the police and was believed by them to be true, and the Sub-Inspector went to the village to make an investigation. It was later ascertained that the information as absolutely false and that the girl was in fact alive and that the mukhia knew on that date that she was alive because she had in fact eloped with him The case against the accused was that knowing that she was alive and also knowing that she had eloped with him, the accused concealed that fact and was a party to supplying false information to the police that she had been drowned so that they may be put on a false scent. The Sub-Inspector addressed and sent to the Superintendent of Police a communication headed as "Report made by Sub-Inspector" in which after mentioning all the allegations constituting the offence and stating that Lakhan, (describing him by name and not calling him an accused) was guilty of an offence under Section 177, I.P.C., concluded with the request: It is therefore prayed that permission under Section 195, Criminal P.C., may be given to institute a case under Section 177, I.P.C., against Lakhaa Singh.

(2.) The Superintendent of Police sent this on to the Magistrate with the endorsement "Forwarded to the S.D.M. for information and necessary action " The S.D. M treated it as a complaint and took cognizance of the offense. The case in Baldeo Singh V/s. Emperor 1926 96 IC 211 decided by Daniels, J. is certainly in favour of the applicant. In that case the learned Judge held that where a report had been made by the Circle Inspector to the Superintendent of Police and submitted by the Superintendent of Police to a Sub-Divisional Officer with the endorsement that it was submitted for favour of disposal and necessary action, there was no proper complaint within the meaning of Section 4(1)(h), Criminal P.C. He clearly held that the endorsement of the Superintendent of Police did not come within the definition of a complaint under which it should be an allegation made to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action. He had before him both the report of the Circle Inspector and the endorsement of the Superintendent of Police and rejected the contention that the endorsement should, be taken as incorporating the preceding report of the Circle Inspector which had contained a definite recommendation that; a prosecution under Section 182 should be instituted because he found it impossible to believe that when the Superintendent of Police wrote the endorsement he considered himself to be making a formal complaint of an offence. The learned Judge also considered that it was not a mere defect of form which can be cured by Section 537, Criminal P.C., but that in such a case the substance of the matter is not there at all.

(3.) It seems to me that this ruling puts a fair and reasonable interpretation on the definition of complaint and the rule laid down therein is a wholesome one. To condone such defects would be merely to encourage slackness on the part of police officers, and thereby to induce them to act contrary to the requirements of the law. In Abdul Rahman V/s. Emperor 1932 ALJ 155 also a brief communication made by a Superintendent of Police was held not to amount to a complaint. I may give additional reasons why the report is not a complaint. Section 190, Criminal P.C., empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence (a) upon receiving a complaint, (b) upon a report of facts made by any police officer and (c) upon information received from another person or upon his own knowledge. This section is general and applies to all offences unless there is any special provision to the contrary. Now Section 195 expressly provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence under Secs.172 to 188, I.P.C., except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or his superior officer. Section 190 is, therefore, subject to the provisions of Section 195, and a Magistrate cannot take cognizance of an offence under any of these sections on a mere report made by a police officer. He has jurisdiction to act only when there is a complaint by such an officer. The legislature has clearly drawn a distinction between a complaint and a mere report by a police officer, otherwise it would not have mentioned both in Section 190 and only one in Section 195. To hold that every report made by a police officer, no matter to whom and with what purpose, amounts to a complaint if it contains all the necessary allegations would, in my opinion, be nullifying the provisions of Section 195(a).