MAHABOOB SIR PRAJUVANTHU SREE RAJAH PARTHASARADHI APPA RAO SAVAJI ASWA RAO BAHADUR ZAMINDAR GARU Vs. TURLAPATI SUBBA RAO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the plaintiff, a Zamindar, sued the legal representatives of a pleader who was employed to conduct certain summary suits, etc., in Bhima-varam for the plaintiff asking for a decree for about Rs. 1,800 being the amount due from the deceased pleader to the Zamindar on account of moneys received and not accounted for by him. Now the Subordinate Judge after calling for findings as to what suits the pleader had appeared in and when those were disposed of, held that only 22 suits were disposed of before the institution of this suit, and the most important point perhaps urged by Mr. Chenchiah for the appellant in L.P. Appeal from the judgment of my brother Phillips (who dismissed the second appeal) is the point of limitation. Mr. Chenchiah urges the following points: Firstly, that there was a general agency, that is to say, that the pleader was what is sometimes called a "standing vakil" to the Zamindar and therefore his agency must be taken to have extended from 1916 when he was first engaged, to his death in March, 1918. Now this contention was not only negatived by my brother Phillips but by the Subordinate Judge also, chiefly on the authority of the case reported in Saffron Walden Second Benefit Building Society V/s. Rayner (1880) 14 Ch. D. 406 where the Lords Justices held that there was no Such thing as an office of a solicitor and Lord Justice James points out that a solicitor is a man's solicitor "when he chooses to employ him and in the matter in which he is so employed" Lord Justice Bramwell says that "a man is a solicitor for another when that other has occasion to employ him as such." It is of course not disputed that in our practice the pleader has to file a separate vakalat for every suit that he institutes on behalf of his client. And that was so in the present course of employment; a separate vakalat being also filed by the pleader in each execution proceedings (Ex. R.) so that in my opinion this contention must be negatived.

(2.) Then it was contended that even if his agency was not general, his accounts were, that is to say, that the pleader maintained an open current account with the client and that the account instead of being closed as each suit was disposed of, simply ran on in the ordinary way, familiar to us, as pay-ments by the employer and drawings against those payments by the pleader. Now that really is a pure matter of surmise because the only accounts that we have in evidence are contained in Ex. R which in my opinion negatives any such idea. There, the suits are kept separate, the expenses for each execution petition are set out and there is no ground for saying on such accounts as we have, that there was anything in the nature of an open running account between the client and his pleader.

(3.) Now, then with regard to limitation, Mr. Chenchiah strongly contended before us that there was a liability to account outstanding at the death of the pleader when the agency terminated and that therefore every item of account within three years from the date of the death of the pleader must be taken into account in this suit. He argued that a new cause of action arises as against the legal representatives and that therefore he is entitled to reckon three years, not from the date of the suit but from the date of the termination of the agency. Now in support of this proposition we have been referred to Kumeda Charan Bala V/s. Asutosh Chattopadhya-ya (1912) 17 C.W.N. 5, Kali Krishna Pal V/s. Srimati Jagattara (1868) 2 Beng. L.R. 139 (F.B.) and Bindra-ban Behari V/s. Jamuna Kunwar (1902) I.L.R. 25 A. 55. It is noteworthy that no Madras case,has been cited, although one is to be found in Natesayyan v. Ponnuswami (1892) I.L.R. 16 M. 99 : 3 M.L.J. 1 to this effect. In fact our law as laid down in Madras is in favour of the opposite view. Natesayyan V/s. Ponnuswami (1892) I.L.R. 16 M. 99 : 3 M.L.J. 1 has been overruled in Mallesam Naidu V/s. Jugala Panda (1899) I.L.R. 23 M. 292 (F.B.), the view which is also supported by Periaswami Mudaliar V/s. Seetharama Chettiar (1903) I.L.R. 27 M. 243 : 14 M.L.J. 84 (F.B.) a and there is direct authority in Arunachalam Chetty V/s. Raman Chetty (1914) 16 M.L.T. 614. Mr. Chenchiah tried to distinguish this case on the ground that there the suit was barred when instituted, feeing more than three years after the death of the agent and therefore could not apply to the principle for which he was contending. But the judgments clearly show that the agent-died in April, 1919, and the suit was brought in December of the same year. The learned Judge held that there was no separate cause of action as against the sons, that is to say, the action against the sons is not different from that against the father and as it was barred against the father, after his life it was also barred against the sons. Mr. Justice Spencer in his judgment in that case distinctly says that Natesayyan V/s. Ponnuswami (1892) I.L.R. 16 M. 99 : 3 M.L.J. 1 has been overruled by the two later Madras cases referred to above and that the matter falls under Art. 89 of the Limitation Act. It was faintly suggested on the authority of the case in Kumeda Charan Bala V/s. Asutosh Chattopadhyaya (1912) 17 C.W.N. 5 that as legal representatives are not mentioned in Art. 89, that article can have no application to a suit like the present. That in my view 13 distinctly overruled by the case in Arunachalam Chetty V/s. Raman Chetty (1914) 16 M.L.T. 614 and it is pointed out by Mr. Varadachariar that there are many articles which would be reduced to absurdity if this contention were applied to them, for instance, Articles 78 and 79. The column under which these articles appear is headed "Description of Suit". To my mind the omission of any mention of legal representatives in the word Under "Description of Suit" does not mean that the article is not intended to apply to a suit against the legal representatives in order to let in Art. 120. It seems to me that in this case we ought to follow the decisions in Arunachalam Chetty V/s. Raman Chetty (1914) 16 M.L.T. 614, Mallesam Naidu V/s. Jugala Panda (1899) I.L.R. 23 M. 292 (F.B.) and Periaswami Mudaliar V/s. Seetharama Chettiar (1903) I.L.R. 27 M. 243 : 14 M.L.J. 84 (F B) and no reason has been shown why any of these decisions should be held to be inapplicable to the present case. It seems to me therefore that the appeal fails on all the points put forward and must be dismissed with costs. Curgenven, J.