KAMMABOYINA RAMADAS Vs. KING-EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner was convicted under Section 21(d) of the Forest Act (V of 1882) and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200. His appeal to the Sessions Judge of Guntur was rejected on the ground that no appeal lay against the conviction in a summary trial, when the fine did not exceed Rs. 200. The petitioner has preferred this revision petition.

(2.) The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the Deputy Magistrate has not correctly applied the law to the facts of the case and that the mere finding of the petitioner's flock of goats grazing within the forest reserve would not by itself make the owner of the goats punishable under Section 21(d). Under that section " any person who pastures cattle or permits cattle to trespass " is punishable with imprisonment for six months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 500, or with both.

(3.) The statement of the law in paragraph 4 of the Deputy Magistrate's judgment- I hold that as the rightful owner of the flock, the accused is responsible for its actions and that his paid servants or agents cannot be solely taken to task. The wo,rd permit used in the section has to be interpreted in its broadest sense and includes all the acts which, though done without his explicit orders, are such as to be guarded against is not correct. The expression " permit his cattle to trespass " means something more than the cattle trespassing within the forest reserve. In order to make the owner liable, there must be something more than the mere finding of his cattle within the forest reserve. If the owner, knowing that the cattle would trespass into the forest reserve, neglects to take proper care of his cattle, or knowing that his servants would take the cattle to the reserved forest, does not forbid them from doing it, or knowing that his servants might take his cattle to the reserve forest connives at it, then he might be said to permit the cattle to trespass; but where without his knowledge or against his orders his servants allow cattle to trespass into the forest reserve, he cannot be held to be guilty. In this case it is a question of fact whether from the circumstances the Magistrate, as a judge of fact, can come to the conclusion that the accused by his act or by his negligence permitted or allowed his cattle to trespass into the forest reserve. If the law is as stated by the Magistrate, then the owner of the cattle would be liable even if his enemy without his knowledge, or his servant, in spite of his orders, drives his cattle into the forest reserve. The law has been correctly stated by Muthuswami Aiyar and Brandt, JJ. in Cr.R.C. No. 253 of 1886 reported in Weir's Criminal Rulings, Vol. I, at page 762 as follows: A person certainly cannot be said to permit cattle to trespass into a reserve forest, unless he knows that such trespass is likely to be committed and neglects with such knowledge to take measures to prevent it. The essence of the offence consists either in a misfeasance, as in the case of one wilfully pasturing cattle, or in a nonfeasance as in his neglecting to take proper measures to prevent the cattle trespassing in circumstances from which it may be reasonably be inferred that such trespass might have been foreseen or known as the probable consequence of his negligence.