LAWS(PVC)-1926-7-48

BANWARI LAL Vs. KING-EMPEROR

Decided On July 12, 1926
BANWARI LAL Appellant
V/S
KING-EMPEROR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the Government revenue due from Banwari Lal was in arrears. A citation to the defaulter to appear on the 2 January, 1926, in case the arrears of Government revenue were not paid soon, was issued by the Tahsildar under Section 147 of the Land Revenue Act. Banwari Lal neither paid the revenue nor appeared on the date fixed. He was in consequence prosecuted and convicted by a First Class Magistrate under Section 174 of the I.P.C. and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 10 and in default to undergo ten days simple imprisonment. Banwari Lal applied to the Sessions Judge in revision for setting aside the aforesaid order, who has referred this case to the High Court. The learned Judge has thought that the non-attendance before the Tahsildar after service of the citation did not make the applicant liable for criminal prosecution under Section 174 of the I.P.C. No further reasons are given.

(2.) Section 146 of the Land Revenue Act provides for the recovery of arrear of revenue by serving on the defaulter a writ of demand or citation to appear. Section 147 of the Act authorizes the issue of a writ of demand or a citation to appear when an arrear of revenue becomes due. Section 174 of the I.P.C. makes the intentional omission to attend in obedience to a summons, notice, order or proclamation, proceeding from any public servant legally competent to issue the same, a punishable offence. The question is whether the citation to appear does not come within the expression "summons, notice, order or proclamation." If the matter were entirely res Integra I would have been inclined to hold that the citation was at any rate a notice, if not a summons or order, and that therefore its disobedience was covered by Section 174 of the I.P.C. I might have sought support from the case of Rambali Singh V/s. King-Emperor [1910] 13 O.C. 55 if the matter were not concluded by a recent pronouncement of a Division Bench in King-Emperor V/s. Birghu Singh Government Appeal No. 821 of 1925, decided on 21 December 1925 which is binding on me as a single Judge.

(3.) The difficulty is created by the word citation in Secs.146 and 147 in distinct contrast with the use of the word summons, notice and proclamation in Ch. 9 of the Act. The Bench thought that the form framed by the Board of Revenue embodies both the writ of demand and the citation in one document. The form before me, however, does not appear to be strictly a writ of demand. It merely says that if the arrears of revenue mentioned therein are not paid soon, then the defaulter should appear on the date fixed. There is no time specifically stated within which the revenue is to be paid, as is required by Section 147. But undoubtedly the way in which the form has been prepared gives to the defaulter the option of either paying the arrears or appearing. It is not an unconditional notice or order to appear without fail. The form is called summons to appear, but that of course would not make it a summons, if a citation is not a summons.