LAWS(PVC)-1926-11-225

AMDU Vs. FAZAL

Decided On November 20, 1926
Amdu Appellant
V/S
FAZAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE facts of this case are sufficiently clear from the application itself, as well as from the order of the lower Court dated 16th September 1925. As is clear from the order-sheet of the said date, the plaintiffs-applicants were ordered to pay Rs. 1,255 extra Court-fees, having regard to the value of the subject-matter of the suit. The learned District Judge, in coming to the decision he did on this point, relied on the decisions in Harihar Prasad Singh v. Shyam Lal Singh [1913] 40 Cal. 615 and Dayaram v. Gordhandas [1907] 31 Bom. 73. These cases have been fully considered by a Bench judgment of this Court in Krishnarao v. Chandrabhagabai A.I.R. 1924 Nag. 316, decided by Baker, J.C., and Prideaux, A.J.C., on the 24th April 1924, and I do not find it necessary to add much to the said judgment. It is pertinent, however, to point out that the decision in Raj Krishna Dey v. Bipin Behari Dey [1913] 40 Cal. 245 was expressly dissented from by the Bombay High Court in Govinda v. Hanmaya A.I.R. 1921 Bom. 65, wherein it was pointed out that whatever the legislature may have intended, the clear meaning of Section 7, Indian Court-fees Act, implies that the plaintiff was at liberty to assign any value to the relief he claims. Still further, this principle was affirmed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Sunderbai v. Collector of Belgaum A.I.R. 1913 P.C. 135. It is clear, therefore, that the plaintiff was entitled to value consequential relief of injunction at any figure he liked, and the order of the lower Court clearly cannot stand.

(2.) I would add further that, even if the relief of injunction had been liable to ad valorem fees, it is difficult to understand why the prayer for amendment of the plaint by abandoning this relief was not granted. For the reasons, however, given fully in the Bench judgment of this Court, with which I respectfully declare my agreement, the order of the lower Court, dated the 16th September 1925, clearly cannot stand, and the lower Court must proceed with the trial of the suit on the plaint as it stands at present.