BALADIN Vs. LAKHAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In execution of a simple money decree a certain house in ruins was sought to be attached and sold by the decree-holder who is the respondent before me. An objection to the attachment was taken on behalf of the judgment-debtor-appellant that the so-called house sought to be attached was in his occupation as an agriculturist and as such was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree held by the respondent. This objection has been overruled by both the Courts below; hence this second appeal by the judgment-debtor.

(2.) The first Court held that the house is in a very dilapidated condition and has no doors, and the roof has fallen down and that the house is not used for residence. This finding and decision has been affirmed by the lower appellate Court.

(3.) In appeal before me it is argued that the mere fact that the judgment-debtor did not reside in the house was no reason for overruling the objection taken by him inasmuch as if it was used by him for storing his agricultural produce, tying cattle and keeping his implements of husbandry etc., even then the house was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree. I agree that it is not necessary for the application of Section 60(1)(c) of the Civil P.C., that the house must be actually used for residence by an agriculturist; all that is necessary for the application of that sub-clause is that the house or other building must belong to an agriculturist and be in his occupation and as such. As held in the case of Bhanja Lal V/s. D.B. Ballabha Dass [1919] 15 N.L.R. 83, it is not necessary that the house or other building should be an actual dwelling house. It is enough If it is used by him for some purposes connected with agriculture. In short the word occupation in Clause (c) does not necessarily mean residence only. But it seems to me that the decisions of the Courts below can be supported on yet another ground. On the findings arrived at by the first Court and not disturbed by the lower appellate Court, it must be taken that the so-called house is now in ruins and there are no doors in it and there is no roof. Such a structure cannot without straining the language be styled a house. Therefore, unless it can be called a building, Section 60(1)(c) will have no application. In the case of Moir V/s. Williams [1892] 1 Q.B. 264, it was observed that the expression building in its ordinary sense "is an enclosure of brick or stone work covered in by a roof." True it is that in that case the word building as used in certain Acts of Parliament had to be construed but in so doing the ordinary meaning of the word building has to be considered. I have referred to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary and I find that in no case has the word building been used with reference to a house in ruins that is a khandhal, as is the structure in the present case. For these reasons I hold that the judgment-debtor was not entitled to the protection afforded by Section 60(1)(c), Civil P.C.