SRI SRI SRI KRISHNA CHANDRA GAJAPATHI NARAYANA DEO MAHARAJULUGARU,ZAMINDAR OF PARLAKIMEDI AND TRUSTEE OF THE GODS SRI RAMASWAMI AND SRI JAGANNADHASWAMI OF PARLAKIMEDI Vs. YALLA RAMAYYA (DEAD)

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiff-appellant, who is the Zamindar of Parlakimedi, brings this suit as trustee o Gods Sri Ramaswami and Sri Jagannathaswami, to whom the suit village of Kosamala was given as an inam either in 1500 or 1700 A.D. The plaint alleges that the grant consisted of both melvaram and kudivaam of the village and that originally rent was paid in kind on the varam system. For a long period, the Parlakimedi estate, including this inam village of Kosamala, was under the control of the Court of. Wards, and in 1869 after the estate had been surveyed a settlement was effected and in that settlement certain money rents based on the nature of the soil and other advantages were fixed. This settlement has continued in force until the date of suit. The plaintiff sues for a declaration that this settlement was beyond the powers of the Court of Wards as trustee of the Gods and is not binding on the plaintiff. He also prays for a declaration that he is entitled to claim rent in kind from the defendants and for an injunction directing the defendants to pay rent in kind from fasli 1326. The plaint is somewhat curiously framed in view of the admitted facts of the case and it seems to have been framed in such a way as to bring this suit entirely within the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. If, as alleged, the plaintiff is entitled to both varams in the lands, the defendants are mere tenants- at-will and the plaintiff could eject them or lease out the lands to them in any manner he pleases; consequently a suit for a declaration that the money rents are not-binding on him seems to be merely a preliminary step before proceeding to exercise the powers which he alleges that he possesses. At the trial, however, a number of other points have been raised and in appeal the plaintiff's case has been put on two bases. Firstly, it is said that the plaintiff, as owner of both varams, is entitled to deal with the lands as he pleases. Secondly, it is contended that, if the melvaram alone vests in the plaintiff, then the act of the Court of Wards in making the settlement of 1869 is ultra vires and not binding upon him. This second claim is nowhere mentioned in the plaint but as the defendants pleaded that they had permanent rights of occupancy and that their rent had been settled for all time, the second portion of the plaintiff's case was also considered.

(2.) I will first deal with the plaintiff's prayer to revert to payment of rent in kind, by which is meant the varam system, under which the landlord takes a definite share of the produce. This undoubtedly is the system which originally prevailed in most parts of this presidency, for it has always been "held that the ruler of the land was entitled to a share in the produce. It is on this theory and on no other evidence that the plaintiff's case must succeed, if at all. The village of Kosamala appears to have been held on a somewhat curious tenure. At the earliest date of which we have any evidence, the village as a whole was leased out to a mustajar who agreed to pay a certain fixed rent in money to the Zamindar. This system continued for a long time, but, in later years instead of leasing the village to a mustajar, the village was leased sometimes to the village officers on behalf of the villagers, and sometimes to a number of villagers and sometimes to all the cultivating ryots of the village. There is not a particle of evidence that the landlord ever dealt directly with each individual ryot and it Is an essential part of the system of varam that each individual should contribute a definite share in what he produces to his landlord. This leasing system is, therefore, clearly not a varam system. We also have evidence that as far back as 1826, the rent of the village was paid in money. The plaintiff relies on certain remarks in Ex. JJ. as showing that there was a system of varam prevailing in his estate. Ex. JJ. consists of official correspondence from 1861 to 1864, which preceded the survey and settlement of the Parlakimedi estate. In this correspondence we find certain references (at pages 29 to 30 of the documents) that there were recognised shares of the produce paid as rent in certain parts of the estate, but there is no reference to such share being paid in Kosamala village. Here I may observe, that although there are admittedly separate accounts for Kosamala village, as of course there must be as it is a trust village, yet the plaintiff who was the trustee has failed to produce any one of these accounts. The only inference that can be drawn from this conduct is that the accounts, if produced, would be unfavourable to his case. Seeing then that there is no evidence of varam rent having been paid in Kosamala at any time and that from so far back as 1826 the rent has always been paid in money, it is impossible for the plaintiff to revert to the system of varam when there is no evidence that it ever existed. Although, therefore, the right of the landlord to revert to varam rents is a very usual right. it is clear that the plaintiff has not proved that he has that right for there is no evidence that such a tenure existed. It is only if it is proved that he is the owner of both the varams that he would have such a right, for he would be dealing with tenants-at-will and can impose.

(3.) Coming to his first prayer that there should be a declaration that the settlement, by which the village has been leased out for money rent according to fixed block rates, is beyond the powers of the trustee, it must be observed that the plaintiff bases his case on the allegation that varam rent was commuted by the Court of Wards into fixed money rent payable for all time. I have shown above that this is clearly wrong, for when the settlement was made, the rent prevailing in the suit village was money rent and all that the Court of Wards did was to survey and classify the village and determine the proper money rent payable on the land. In doing this, they cannot be said to have exceeded their powers unless it can be shown that they granted a permanent lease which would not be binding on the trust estate.