D K ASHER Vs. VCGOPALARATNAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal against an order of Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., refusing to allow inspection of certain accounts which were disclosed in the affidavit of documents of the defendant. A preliminary question arises as to whether an appeal lies against such an order and the question is whether an order in an interlocutory application refusing inspection is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Mr. G. Krishnaswami Aiyar who appears for the appellant is unable to cite any authority in support of his argument that an appeal lies. He bases his contention on the ground that such an order is not an order on a mere matter of procedure but deprives the party of a substantive right and is therefore a judgment I am unable to agree with him.

(2.) The definition of the word judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent has, I think, so far as Madras is concerned, been settled by the decision of the Full Bench in Tuljaram Row V/s. Alagappa Chettiar (1910) ILR 35 M 1: 21 MLJ 1(FB). where Sir Arnold White, C.J., observes as follows: The test seems to me to be not what is the form of the adjudication but what is its effect in the suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form may be, and whatever may be the nature of the application on which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding,so far as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or if its effect, if it is not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, I think the adjudication is a judgment within the meaning of the clause. An adjudication on an application which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit is not, in my opinion, a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. I think, too, an order on an independent proceeding which is ancillary to the suit (not instituted as a step towards judgment, but with a view to rendering the judgment effective if obtained) e.g., an order on an application for an interim injunction, or for the appointment of a receiver is a judgment within the meaning of the clause.

(3.) This view has been followed in The Official Assignee of Madras V/s. Ramalingappa (1925) ILR 49 M 539: 50 MLJ 361 where the learned Chief Justice after referring to Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar (1910) ILR 35 M 1: 21 MLJ 1(FB). observes as follows: Applying that and endeavouring as best as I can to see what is its true application, 1 think it is this, that a determination, call it what you will, which has the effect, whether on a technical ground or on the merits, of putting an end to the proceedings as regards the particular people or in toto, is a judgment and is appealable, but if the pronouncement leaves the suit free to go on, then it is not a judgment within the meaning of the clause.