SADASHEO Vs. VITHOBA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ON the present application for review of the judgment of this Court dated 11th July 1925, coming on for hearing, counsel for the non-applicants raised an objection that no review lay having regard to the provisions Section 114 and Order 47, Rule 1, Civil P.C. It was urged that, avowedly, there had been no discovery of any new and important matter or evidence, that there was no mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and that there was no other sufficient reason for granting the review.

(2.) ON behalf of the applicant a considerable argument was developed to the effect that this Court had omitted to appreciate the full force of the words: at the commencement of this law, has either by himself or by himself and through his predecessor-in-title, sub-tenant or mortgagee in possession, held and continuously from a date previous to the first day of June 1895. in Section 47, Berar Alienated Villages tenancy Law, 1921. It was urged that the tenant had been out of possession from March 1921 to 1st June 1922, and that, in those circumstances it was impossible to hold that he had been holding the land continuously. This point was fully considered by me in the judgment in question, and whether my decision thereon is correct or not, it is only too obvious that by no stretch of terms and by no process of forced interpretation could the erroneous view on this point, assuming it to be such on the legal question involved, be deemed to fall within the provisions of Rule 1, Sub-rule (1), of Order 47. The question of the interpretation of the said rule has been discussed at length by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chhajju Ram v. Neki A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 112 and on the principles laid down therein, the present application for review clearly, in my opinion, does not lie for the reasons stated therein.

(3.) FINALLY , as regards the words " any other sufficient reason " in the rule referred to, it is impossible to bring any of the grounds under this category in view of the act that their Lordships of the Privy Council have construed the said term as meaning a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously.