(1.) THE first point argued in this appeal is that the plaintiff having disclaimed or abandoned the tenancy in the previous suit she ceased to be the tenant and could not again be a tenant without a new contract. I am of the opinion that the plaintiff did not abandon the tenancy. She was in possession as a Hindu widow and having adopted a son she alleged that she had in law ceased to be entitled to hold the land since the adopted son had taken her place as tenant. This is all that can be attributed to her. I cannot accept the contention that her words and conduct amounted to an unqualified abandonment. The plaintiff cannot be said to have given out, as it is contended she did, that she did not under any circumstances wish to have any connexion with the land. There was no intention on her part to abandon the land and that the landlord knew this.
(2.) THE withdrawal of the suit for rent was not really induced by any representation of the plaintiff that she had unqualifiedly abandoned the land. The defendants-appellants were hoping to make capital as they are now trying to do out of the plaintiff's statement.
(3.) THE last point argued is the one of limitation. It is said that the suit is barred under Article 1 of the second Schedule, Tenancy Act, 1920. After the adoption of Mahadeo the plaintiff continued in possession as the guardian of Mahadeo. I am not prepared to accede to the contention that the plaintiff as guardian of Mahadeo must be deemed to have excluded herself from possession. Even if a person other than the plaintiff had been the guardian of Mahadeo and the plaintiff had put him in possession on Mahadeo's behalf, her cessation of possession could not have been said to be brought about by any act of dispossession or exclusion. The lower appellate Court has sufficiently discussed this matter in para. 10 of its judgment.