MADURU BRAHMAYYA Vs. VEDULA VELLAMMA (DIED)

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This case is typical of the want of care, precision and information with which execution applications are presented to courts. The decree was passed on the 31st of March 1900. The applications made from 1903 up to the one we are dealing with, were all dismissed owing to failure to comply with the requirements of the law. The application of the 22nd March 1912, just within a few days of 1.2 years was so defective that the court had to return it for amendment no less than six times. This went on till the 28th June 1912. On this date, the Subordinate Judge felt bound to dismiss the application, as the particulars he called for were not furnished. A perusal of the B diary shows how negligent was the conduct of these proceedings. Then we enter upon another stage. On the 8th of July, an application for restoration was presented accompanied by affidavits which are as inadequate as any can be. Here again, the B. Diary shows that the Court had to return the petition for amendment more than once. After the amendments were made, "Batta was not paid as directed," and the court dismissed the restoration application on the 14th of August 1912. Then an application for restoring this dismissed restoration petition was made and that was granted on the 18th of November 1912 and final orders were passed on it on the 25th of March 1913. One cannot help saying that the way this petition has been conducted is calculated not only to unduly and unnecessarily waste the time of the court, but to endanger seriously the interests of the parties.

(2.) We now proceed to deal with the petition on the merits. Mr. Nagabhushanam has taken the preliminary objection that the appeal is incompetent inasmuch as it is based on grounds other than those to which an appellant is restricted by Order 47 Rule 7.

(3.) The question has been argued at length by the learned vakils on either side. The first matter which attracts attention is the peculiar wording of the Rule. Clause (1) says that " an order granting an application may be objected to on the ground that the application was in contravention of certain provisions. Clause (a) does not require much notice. The expression application or order would be equally applicable to the provisions of Rule (2) although there can be no doubt that the Legislature had in mind the contingency of the order granting the review being made by another Judge rather than the fact that the presentation of the application was to a different judge. But when we come to Clause (6) the inappropriateness of the wording is manifest, Rule 4(2) relates to the granting of the application. There can be no doubt that the grounds of appeal will ordinarily be directed against the order granting the Review. Clause (c) may refer to the application itself and not to the final order.