VUTUCHURU RAMACHANDRA REDDI Vs. KAKUTUR AUDEMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (1st and 2nd defendants in the suit) were not brought on record in this appeal within the time allowed. No proper explanation is given for the delay. The appeal is dismissed as against them with costs.

(2.) There is no substance in. the objection raised by the plaintiff - respondent that because the 2nd and 3rd respondents, her sisters, were not made parties in time, the appeal must be dismissed as against herself aa well. The appellants take exception to particular items of property in which the plaintiff-respondent has been given Jth share by the decree appealed from. If the appellants succeed the result would be that the respondent to the extent of ?th share would be liable to make restitution. It may be that the 2nd and 3rd respondents would still retain their shares, but it does not lie in the mouth of the plaintiff-respondent to complain of that.

(3.) The only substantial question raised in the appeal is as to the effect of the judgment in O.S. No. 13 of 1895. In the first place, it is argued that the widow of Chenchurama Reddi i.e., Ramalakshmamma having brought a suit against Lakshmamma (5th respondent) for possession of property and that suit having been dismisased on the question of limitation the decree operates as res judicata. The present suit is by the reversioner whose title is independent of that of the widow. It is however contended on the strength of the decision of the Privy Council in Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohan Goswami (1893) I.L.R. 21 C. 8 that the effect of the decree was to bar the present suits. But that decision is distinguishable on the ground that in that case title by adverse possession had been completed while Act XIV of 1859 was in force, and by Section 12 of that Act, according to the rulings, it was not only the right of the widow to recover possession that would be barred but the right of the reversioner as well, that is to say, adverse possession for 12 years had the effect under the law at the time of extinguishing the title of the widow as well as of the reversioner to the property. Under the later Acts title by adverse possession against the reversioner commences only on the death of the widow. That the decision in Hari Nath Ghatterjee v. Mothurmohan Goswami (1898) I.L.R. was based on the ground that the title by adverse possession was completed while the Act of 1859 was in force, seems reasonably clear from a recent decision of the Privy Council in Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain (1911) I.L.R. 33 A. 356. There their Lordships point out the effect of Section 12 of Act XIV of 1859 and say that the subsequent acts of 1871 and 1877 could not lead to the revival of a right that had already become barred. They go on, then, to draw attention to the ruling in Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohan Goswami (1893) I.L.R. 21 C. 8 where it was observed that "the intention of the law of limitation is, not to give a right where there is not one, but to interpose a bar after a certain period to a suit to enforce an existing right," We think it can be fairly inferred that in Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain (1911) I.L.R. 33 A. 356 the Judicial Committee intended to point.out thai their decision in Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohan Goswami (1898) I.L.R. 21 C. 8, was baaed mainly on the provisions of the Act of 1859. Mr. Justice Knox of the Allahabad High Court in Hanuman Prasad Singh v. Bhagabhati Prasad (1897) I.L.R. 19 A. 357 also understood the last decision in this light. In a recent decision of this Court by the learned Chief Justice find Justice Burn where the facts were similar to the facts in the present case, the learned Judges held that Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohan Goswami (1898) I.L.R. 21 C. 8 did not apply, though they distinguished it on the ground that the previous suit in that case was by a daughter and not by a widow.