RAJ CHANDRA BHUIYA Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This was a Rule obtained by the petitioner to show cause why the conviction and sentence complained of should not be set aside.

(2.) The conviction was on the l8th of April 1916. On the 22nd of May 1916 an application by way of motion was made to the learned Sessions Judge asking that he would refer the case to the High Court. On the 29th of May the learned Sessions Judge dismissed that application. On the 26th of July a Rule was obtained in this Court by the petitioner, calling upon the District Magistrate to show cause why the conviction of the 18th April should not be set aside. In connection with this matter a question of practice arises. The rule which was laid down in accordance with the established practice of this Court was as follows : It is reported in the case of Khetra Mohan Giri v. Darpa Narain Giri 36 Ind. Cas. 979 : 20 C.W.N. 1170 : 17 Cr. L.J. 419 : 43 C. 1029. "The well-known practice is that an application for revision must be made within sixty days from the date of the order complained of. The Court has allowed an addition, to the sixty days, of the time which is necessary for obtaining copies. This is not a question of limitation, but a rule of the practice of the Court to the effect that an application for revision must be made within a reasonable time." I do not think that at the time of the pronouncement of the Court s order the particular point mentioned in this case was present to our mind. The point is whether in a case in which there has been an application to the Sessions Judge as in this case, the sixty days are to be counted from the refusal of the Sessions Judge to refer the matter to the High Court or whether the time is to be ascertained by counting the days from the date of the order complained of. I have made enquiries from the learned Judges who have had experience in dealing with matters in the Criminal Appeal Court. They are of opinion that there is no definite practice upon this particular point. But they are of opinion that the practice should be definitely decided. Therefore, we propose to lay down what ought to be the practice of this Court in such oases, and what, I think, will be considered to be a reasonable practice. But before doing so I desire to say that this is not a question of limitation; it is merely a matter of practice and it is made not only for the purpose of the administration of the business of the Courts but also in the interests of the accused persons themselves. It is most undesirable that a question of revision should be allowed to be unduly delayed. An application for revision ought to be made at the earliest possible moment. It is also to be stated that the rule is not an inflexible rule, and that this Court has reserved to itself the power, when exceptional circumstances are proved, to depart from it.

(3.) What we think ought to be the practice in a case of this kind where the accused person makes an application to the Sessions Judge and the Sessions Judge refuses to refer the case to this Court is this: The sixty days shall be counted from the date of the conviction or the order complained of, but the time which is occupied in prosecuting with diligence the application before the Sessions Judge and obtaining his decision should be added to the sixty days, just in the same way as the time necessary for obtaining copies.