VALLURI NARASIMHA RAO PANTULU GARU Vs. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL REPRESENTED BY THE COLLECTOR OF KISTNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises in a suit instituted by the plaintiff, who is the appellant before us, in order co have it declared that certain lands now in possession of the kamams are not resumable by the Government. His case is, that they are darimila inams, or inams granted subsequent to the Permanent Settlement and, therefore, the Government has no fight to resume them. The learned District Judge found against the appellant, merely on the ground that because the zemindari in which the inam is situated was resumed after the Permanent Settlement and re-granted in 1836 to the predecessor-in-title of the present zemindar of Yelamanchili, The state of things to be taken into account is that of 1836 and not of 1802 Upon the evidence, there seems to be very little doubt that the inam in question cannot be traced to 1802. The earliest date to which it can be traced is 1819, that is, subsequent to the Permanent Settlement. The Government have not produced the papers and accounts relating to 1802, and it is said that they are not available. But whatever papers are available go to suggest that this inam came into existence after 1802. There were apparently two kinds of inams held by the ancestors of the kamams who are the defendants in the suit other than the 1st defendant, who is the Secretary of State for India in Council. One was called darimiia or personal inam and the other karnam s service inam. n 1865, the Government enfranchised two putties as personal inam and the plaintiff s case is that what is now left is service mam and that it did not exist prior to 1802. The accounts which have been filed, Exhibit A series and Gr, all show that 1? putties Were personal inam and 1? putties were mirasi or service inam. The argument on behalf of the Government is that as there was a re-grant in 1836, it must be held that the lands in dispute were excluded from the assets of the zemindari. But the learned District Judge himself points out in paragraph 1% of his judgment that the figures show that exactly the same peishcmh was fixed in 1836 as that which was in force in 1802* Much stress was laid by the learned Vakil who appeared for the 1st defendant on a passage in Exhibit AA, the sannad granted in 1836, where it is stated that the grant is made exclusive of lakheraj lands, i.e., lands exempt from the payment of public revenue. The argument is that all these lands are lakheraj lands and were excluded from the assests of the zemindari. But lahheraj land, as defined in the sannad itself, means land exempt from the payment of public revenue. Now, if, as a mattpr of fact, these inams were not in existence at the time of the Permanent Settlement of 1802, and there is no evidence to show that the Government granted the lands at any time subsequent to 1^02, the position would be this. The lahheraj lands; mentioned in the sannad if it referred to these lands, would mean lands which had been made revenue-free by the zemindar himself. It could not possibly have that meaning: because the zemindar had not power to grant land free from payment of public revenue.

(2.) It may also be mentioned that the lands now in possession of the karnams as inams are about 28 acres and the Government claimed to enfranchise the whole of this 28 acres, although the accounts and other documents produced in the case show that the service inam in possession of the karnam was 1? putties, one putti being equivalent to 8 acres. As we have found that the inam itself came into existence after the Permanent Settlement, it is not necessary to ascertain in this case, how the 1| putties held by the harnam came to be 28 acres.

(3.) The judgment of the learned District Judge is wrong and is based entirely on the fact that there was are-grant in 1896. He says that it should be presumed that these lands were excluded from the assets of the zemindar as lakheraj lands. The Government, if it chose, could have undoubtedly done so. But the facts of the case indicate that these lands were not excluded from the assets. We reverse the judgment of the District Judge. There will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff, declaring that the suit lands are darimila service inam and that the enfranchisement made by the Government is ultra vires and not binding on the plaintiff.