(1.) The first ground upon which the deed of settlement of October 13th, 1894 was impeached by the plaintiff was that it was executed by Rajaratna in ignorance of its content and its legal effect. The suggestion was that when Rajaratna executed the deed he did so under the belief that he was merely appointing his brother-in- law Guruswami as his agent.
(2.) The trustees appointed by the deed are Rajaratna s wife and his wife s brother Guruswami. There is not a title of evidence that anything in the nature of undue influence was exercised by Guruswami or that Rajaratna was not in full possession of his faculties when he executed the document. The solicitor who drafted the instrument deposed that its contents were explained to Rajaratna. During his lifetime Rajaratna never disavowed or attempted to repudiate the document. His cousin Gopalaswami (the father of the plaintiff), the representative of the branch of the family whose interests were adversely affected by the deed, was aware that it had been executed and took no steps to get it set aside. Rajaratna s wife joined in the deed and conveyed her own private estate to the trustees, and she was also one of the trustees appointed by the deed. It is not suggested that there was any motive for executing the deed such as defeating creditors or otherwise carrying out a sham transaction. The motive for which the deed purports to have been executed, viz., to relieve Rajaratna, who appears to have been a bad man of business, of the responsibility of managing his property and of making provision for his widow and grand-children and their issue, was a perfectly natural one. There is nothing in the circumstances connected with the registration of the instrument, or in the fact that the mitta remained registered in Rajaratna s name, which is inconsistent with the view that Rajaratna knew he was divesting himself of his property and that he intended to do so. It is not necessary to discuss in detail the evidence on which the appellant relied as showing Rajaratna did not know what he was about when he executed the deed. The evidence merely shows that Rajaratna, so long as he lived, continued to take a more or less active part in the management of the property and the trustees wore content that he should do so. This is natural enough. On the other hand we find that Rajaratna wrote to his cousin Gopalaswami six months before the execution of the deed (exhibit G) a letter in which, after referring to his money troubles, he stated that he intended, according to Gopalaswami s advice, to execute a document for the purpose of paying creditors, taking fixture income for expenses and receiving a fixed monthly income for himself Again on May 7th, 1896 a mortgage (exhibit L) was executed by Rajaratna and the two trustees in which the settlement of October 13th, 1894 is recited. 2. We agree with the Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff entirely failed in his attempt to show that when Rajaratna executed the deed he did not know what he was about.
(3.) It was further argued on behalf of the appellant that, assuming that Rajaratna understood the effect of the document, the document was inoperative, because Rajaratna did not do all that the law required in order to divest himself of the property. The argument was that something was required over and above the execution of the conveyance and the registration, something in the nature of physical delivery of possession in order to transfer the property. There is nothing in Section 6 of the Trusts Act to suggest that trust-property cannot be effectively transferred by a registered instrument. Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act expressly provides that for the purposes of a gift of immoveable property the transfer must be effected by registered instrument. We see no reason for holding that what is sufficient in the case of a gift of laud is not sufficient in the case of a conveyance of land in trust We are of opinion that the deed in question operates as a transfer of the property and a valid declaration of trust.