MAGUNTA VEERARAGHAVA REDDI Vs. MAGUNTA VEERARAGHAVA REDDI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) There are two appeals before us from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge. Appeal No. 273 is preferred by the plaintiff and Appeal No. 279 by the defendants.

(2.) There were three brothers, Rama Reddi, Venku Reddi and Krishna Reddi, forming a joint Hindu family. The plaintiff is the son of Venku Reddi. Rama Reddi left three sons, Veeraraghava Reddi, Subba Reddi and Kothandarama Reddi. The defendant is the son of Kothandarama Reddi. Krishna Reddi when he died left a widow called Akkamma.

(3.) The question which we have to decide is whether there was a partition among these three brothers in the lifetime of Krishna Reddi himself. The Subordinate Judge has come to the conclusion that the partition was after his death and we have no doubt that this is a correct conclusion. The oral evidence on the point is not of very much importance. The question rests upon the document Exhibit A, which is a deed of relinquishment executed by the widow of Venku Reddi, the mother of the plaintiff, on 4th March 1876, and on a recital in Exhibit XXI, the Will executed by Akkamma on the 31st October 1912. The recital in Exhibit A is in support of the case of the plaintiff that the partition was after Krishna Reddi s death. The recital in the Will is to the opposite effect but there is no difficulty in holding that that recital is not reliable and cannot be acted upon. The statement in Exhibit A, which was executed nearer the date of the partition, is far more likely to be correct than what is stated in Exhibit XXI. Besides, so far as Exhibit XXI is concerned, the defendant with whom Akkamma was living was interested in having a recital inserted such as that which occurs in Exhibit XXI. Exhibit H shows that on partition in 1866, that is ten years before the execution of Exhibit A itself, Akkamma got one-third share of the family property in lieu of her maintenance and Venku Reddi, who had left his village to settle in his wife s village called Chinthathopu, agreed to relinquish his share of Rs. 600. This sum of Rs. 600 with the interest thereon was received by the plaintiff s mother in 1876 when Exhibit A was executed. As is evident from the terms of Exhibit A and from the admitted facts of the case, Akkamma received one-third share in lieu of her maintenance and it is conceded that on her death the property would revert to the family, that is to say, the plaintiff and the defendant will have a half share each in the one- third share which Akkamma was given in lieu of her maintenance. Venku Reddi s share was sold to Subba Reddi and Akkamma. Under that sale Akkamma acquired one-sixth of the whole. The question has been raised before us--it was raised also in the lower Court--whether this one-sixth is to be regarded as an accretion to the one-third share which she was in possession of in lieu of her maintenance and would go to the family; or whether it must be treated as her stridhanam property and as such devolve on her heirs. Upon this point there can be no doubt as to the state of the law in this Presidency, and I think it is covered in its essential aspects by the Full Bench ruling of this Court reported as Subramanian Chetti v. Arunachelam Chetti 28 M. 1. The whole question as regards accretion to or incorporation with property held by a Hindu female is fully discussed there and what has been laid down as being the law prevalent in this Presidency is binding upon as. The proposition which is there enunciated is in these words: "Where, however, what is given is current income not for mere use and return, but for actual consumption, it would be almost absurd to talk of an intention that there should be any reverter, it being now thoroughly well established that what may not have been consumed may be disposed of by the female as she likes. In such circumstances, whether as a matter of common sense or of legal principle, but one view is possible, viz., that money so received is the absolute property of the woman descendible as such to her own heirs." In that case, what the woman enjoyed was allowance for maintenance in shape of money and the only difference between that case and this, therefore, is that here the woman received maintenance from the income of the property which she was in possession of for that purpose. That however, can make no difference in the application of the principle which I have just quoted. The property itself which Akkamma was in possession of would revert to the family on her death. She was entitled to the income in her own right for her maintenance and she was entirely free to use it as she liked. She was possessed of absolute powers of disposition over the whole of that income and when she died the property itself would go, like any other property which belonged to her absolutely in her own right, to her heirs.