RANI DEBENDRABALA DASI, EXECUTRIX TO THIS ESTATE OF LATE KUMAR SRISH CHANDRA SINGHA BAHADUR Vs. LALIT MOHAN GHOSE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In these six suits the plaintiffs claimed to recover, possession of lands which were formerly chowkidari chakran lands of the village but had been resumed by Government. The plaintiffs are the dar-patnidars having all the rights that were leased to the patnidars. The defendants are the zemindars and the tenants in occupation of the lands.

(2.) At the hearing of these appeals, three points only have been argued, having reference to the rights of the dar-patnidars to these lands under their leases, the question of limitation and the right to eject the tenant-defendants. The first point turns on the construction of the patni lease, Exhibit VII. It is conceded that it cannot be argued that chakran lands were excluded by the general terms in which the lands of the mauza were described. Reliance is placed on the following special clause: "That if any land or jama be excluded from this patni taluk under any law or order of Court you shall not be competent to raise any objection to the payment of the aforesaid jama on that account." In my opinion, the lower Appellate Court was right in holding that these words could not be held to be applicable, to the lands resumed by the Collector under the Chowkidari Act VI (B.C.) of 1870. Lands so resumed are not really excluded from the patni taluk. Under the Act, after resumption, the Collector is bound to re-settle them with the zemindar, subject to all contracts there before made; that is to say, subject to the patnidar s rights. I do not think that it was the intention of the parties that these words in the lease should be made to refer to the mere temporary exclusion that occurs during the interval between the resumption by the Collector of the chakran lands and their re-settlement with the zemindar.

(3.) As regards limitation, the only point argued is that the cause of action must be held to have arisen on the date of the resumption. Admittedly, if it arose on the re-settlement or at any subsequent date, the suits were not barred. I cannot see how the resumption can be said to have given rise to the cause of action in these suits. By the resumption, the plaintiffs right to these lands was in no way assailed. As I have already stated, the Collector is bound by the Statute to recognise the zemindar s right and the zemindar is also bound by the Statute to recognise the patnidar s right, if any, in the chakran lands. The cause of action could only arise on the zemindar showing by some act that he disputed the plaintiffs right. In any case it could not possibly arise before the re-settlement.