SANKARALINGA TEVAN Vs. AVUDAI AMMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Accused Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 9 in this case filed civil suits against the complainant befrre the 8th accused, the Village Munsif of Ettaiyapuram. Tending the suits, the 3rd and 9th accused applied to the 8th accused to attach the jutka and pony of the complainant before judgment. This was ordered, and the jutka and the pony were removed from the house of the complainant. The talayari who carried out the orders of the 8th accused and the persons who assisted in the removal of the properties are the other accused. The complaint is one of theft and of abetment thereof. A charge was framed against all the accused on the 1st April 191(5 After that, this Court was moved to stay proceedings and to cancel the charge against the accused. As regards accused Nos. 1 to 7 and 9 this Court has no right to interfere at this stage. It was sought to be argued that the evidence lot in does not disclose any offence against them. 1 refused to listen to this argument, because that is not a matter which, even if I had the power, I desire to pronounce any opinion upon. These accused will have every facility of putting forward their case in the Court below.

(2.) As regards the 10th accused, the talayari, he is not a public servant not removable from his office without the sanction of the Government of India or the Local Government and consequently no sanction is necessary under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for prosecuting him.

(3.) The case of the 8th accused is different. It is common ground that he had no power to order attachments before judgments in suits pending before him. It is clear that he was a Judge in respect of the suits filed before him. This position was not disputed by the learned Public Prosecutor. It was strenuously contended before me that as in ordering the attachment he was doing an act ultra vires of his powers, he was not acting as such Judge" within the meaning of the section. Broadly put, the contention is that when a Judge or public servant exceeds the limit of his power, he is not within the protective provisions of Section 197. I am unable to accept this contention. If this argument is pushed to its logical conclusion no public servant or Judge can have the safeguard of a sanction, as it is not within the powers conferred upon such an officer to commit an offence. Any offence committed by such a person must prima facie be beyond his official rights and duties. I do not think that such a result is the necessary consequence of the language employed by the Legislature.