FATEH LAL Vs. MRCHARLES EDWARD GRAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Official Assignee of the Estate of Panna Chand-Chunni Lal against the defendants in respect of certain dealings between them. Neither the first Court nor the Court below made any preliminary decree" for an account. There can be no doubt that in the suit it was necessary, in order to ascertain the amount of money due to or from the parties, that an account should be taken. Order XX, Rule 16, of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in a suit for an account of pecuniary transactions between a principal and an agent and in a y other suit not thereinoefore provided for, where it is necessary, in order to ascertain the amount of money due to or from any party, that an account should be taken, the Court shall, before passing its tinal decree, pass a preliminary decree directing such account to be taken as it thinks fit. We think that the Court ought to have passed such a preliminary decree in the present suit.

(2.) TWO questions of principle have been raised by the appellants here. It is stated that there were transactions between the firm of Panna Chand-Chunni Lal and the defendants relating to transactions in both Cawnpore and Calcutta and that the plaintiff is seeking to recover what is alleged to be due solely in respect of the Cawnpore dealing. The defendants contend that all the dealings between the parties should be gone into and that if this is done, the result will show a balance in their favour or at least the balance against them will be considerably reduced. We think that this contention is correct. It would be obviously most inequitable that the assignee in bankruptcy should recover the full amount due in respect of the dealings in Cawnpore, whilst the defendants could only get a compensation in respect of the dealings in Calcutta if it was found that the balance on that account was in their favour. It is also stated that the Assignee has claimed commission on goods which the insolvent firm purchased on its own behalf. The respondent states that these items though claimed have not been allowed. It is unnecessary for us to say whether or not the items for such commission have been allowed, but we hold that the firm of Panna Chand-Chunni Lal would not be entitled to commission on goods purchased on their own behalf. We allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of both the Courts below and remand the case to the Court of first instance through the lower Appellate Court, with directions to re-admit the suit on its original number and to pass a preliminary decree directing what accounts should be taken. These accounts should, in our opinion, include accounts o the dealings both in Cawnpore and Calcutta. Costs here and heretofore will be costs in the cause.