PADMANUND SING Vs. ANANT LAL MISSER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question referred to ua is: whether it is competent to a Coutt to reject a plaint under Section 54, clause (b) of the Civil Procedure Code, after the plaint has been admitted and duly registered. I do not desire to be understood as saying that in no circumstances would it be competent to the Court to reject a plaint after it has once been admitted and duly registered. I pan conceive cases in which such a course might be possible, but I think they would be very exceptional. In the circumstances, however, of this particular case, I am of opinion that the plaint could not and ought not to have been rejected having been once admitted and registered. The facts found by the Referring Court are as follows : " This is an appeal on behalf of the plaintiffs in a suit for rent. The plaint, when originally presented on the 23 June 1902, was insufficiently stamped. The plaintiffs were directed by the Court to piy the dencit Court- fees on or before the 5 July. The Court-fees, however, were not supplied till the 9 July, i.e., after the expiry of the time allowed by the Court. _ The plaintiffs did not ask for any extension of time nor was any order made by the Court for extension. The plaint was, however, directed to be. admitted and registered and was admitted and registered accordingly. On the 2 March, 1903, which was the date fixed for the final hearing of the suit, the defendants put in a petition praying that the plaint might be rejected under Section 54 of the Civil Procedure Code, inasmuch as the deficit Court-fees had not been paid within the time originally fixed by the Court. This application was allowed and the plaint was rejected. Upon appeal by the plaintiffs the order of the First Court, which operates as a decree, was confirmed. The plaintiffs have appealed to this Court " In these circumstances the deficit Court-fees having been accepted by the Court, though a few days after the time fixed and the plaint admitted and registered ou the direction of the Court, the power conferred on the Court to reject under Section 54 was exhausted. As a general rule I should hold that when once the Court has admitted and registered a plaint it cannot subsequently reject it. In the present case by the course it adopted the Court must be taken to have extended the time for paying in the Court-fees up to the 9 July, when they were actually paid in and accepted and to have treated this as the time fixed for payment of the deficit. The Court cannot go behind this. To allow it to do so might lead to the gravest injustice. Take the case of a suit for a large .property : an insufficient Court-fee originally paid : time given for payment of the deficit : the deficit not so paid in, but paid in two or three days afterwards, accepted by the Court and the plaint admitted,and registered. At the last moment after the incurring possibly of great expense in the conduct of the case, the plaint is rejected on the ground of the deficit not having been paid within the time fixed. If the Court had rejected the plaint in the first instance on the ground that the deficit was tendered too late, the plaintiff could then have brought a fresh action, whilst, very possibly, by the objection beiug taken at so fate a stage, such new suit would be barred by limitation. This would be a grave injustice attributable to the action of the Court itself, which lulled the plaintiff into a sense of false security by admitting and registering big plaint.

(2.) As regards the authorities there is a difference of judicial opinion Habibul Hossein v. Mahomed Reza(1881) I.L.R. 8 Calc. 192 supports my view. A contrary view was taken in Brahananoyi Dasi V/s. Andi Si(1899) I.L.R. 27 Calc. 376 Karaman Singh V/s. Norman Cockell (1897) 1 C.W.N. 670 may be distinguished : there the plaintiff refused to pay the deficiency : although I should have thought that would have been ground for refusing to go on with his case, until it had been paid, rather than for rejection under Section 54. The practical result would be the same.

(3.) In the Madras High Court the decisions are conflicting : see Valiya Kesarea Vadhyar v. Suppannair (1880) I.L.R. 2 Mad. 308 and Venkatesa Taxker V/s. Ramasami Chettair (1895) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 338 .Kishore Singh V/s. Sabdal Singh (1889) 1.L.R. 12 All. 553 is against my view : that case was apparently decided on the ground that as in Section 53 there was a limitation of time and there was not in Section 54, the power given under the latter section could be exercised at any time. With great respect I am unabte to accept this reasoning. The question seems to me to be whether the power under Section 54 is not exhausted, when the plaint has once been admitted and registered. The Court has to decide under that section, whether, when a plaint is tendered, it ought to be admitted or ought to be rejected. If it admit it, I do not think any way in circumstances such as the present that it can subsequently reject it.